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BEYOND TUCKER v. LASSEN: THE FUTURE OF
THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE IN CALIFORNIA
Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Association' might be termed
the case of the seven thousand dollar loan which shook the lending in-
dustry. The decision has received considerable attention within the
real estate and lending community and promises to cause significant
changes in the use of the due-on-sale clause in California. In brief,
the California Supreme Court in Tucker ruled that a lender may not
automatically enforce a due-on-sale clause in instances in which the
trustor-obligor 2 has entered into an installment land contract' to sell the
real property secured by a deed of trust (or mortgage) to a third party.
4
The purpose of this note is to consider the Tucker decision in light of
previous California cases and to explore the impact which it may have
on future use of the due-on-sale clause.5 The note begins with a dis-
1. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
2. The term "trustor-obligor" describes anyone who secures a loan under a deed
of trust for the purchase of real property.
The use of deed of trust in a real estate transaction may be best understood by
illustration. Suppose A wishes to buy some land. He goes to an institutional lender (L)
and applies for a loan. L agrees to make the loan, on condition that A executes a trust
deed.
A, L, and a trust company (T) draw up the necessary document. Technically, A
puts the land in trust, and he names T as trustee and L as beneficiary. A becomes a
trustor.
In theory, when A signs the trust deed, title to the land passes from A to T. See R.
HETLAND, SYLLABUS ON CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY SECURED TRANSACTIONS (1962). On
the other hand, T receives no right of possession. Comment, Debtor-Selection Provisions
Found in Trust Deeds and the Extent of their Enforceability in the Courts, 35 S. CAL. L.
REv. 475 (1962). Moreover, although title technically passes to T, he must reconvey the
property to A upon payment of the loan: "In other words, legal title passes to the trustee
solely for the purpose of securing the performance of the obligation and he receives only
such title as necessary for the execution of his trust; until a default occurs or the
obligation is satisfied by the trustor, the trustee's title remains inactive." 1 H. MILLER &
M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 372 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
MILLER & STARR].
3. See text accompanying notes 62-77 infra.
4. 12 Cal. 3d at 637, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
5. The potential impact which the Tucker decision could have on the lending
industry, and on society as a whole, is significant. In California, as of December 31,
1973, savings and loan associations held mortgage loans totalling $41,116,457,000.
CALIF. DEP'T OF FINANCE, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 123 (1974). In the entire
United States, in 1972, $51,400,000,000 worth of mortgage loans was made in one year,
of which $8,500,000,000 went for home construction and $26,600,000,000 went for home
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cussion of the California cases prior to Tucker which have dealt with
"due-on" provisions. Following this introduction, the focus shifts to
the new test announced in the Tucker decision and the applications
which this test might have to real property transactions such as "wrap-
around" mortgages, sale-leasebacks, sale-buybacks, "front money" ar-
rangements, and outright sales in which a legal title is conveyed to the
buyer at closing. The note considers as well the effect of the Tucker
decision on foreclosures by national banks. Finally, it discusses three
grounds upon which the due-on-sale clause may be challenged in the
future: as a prejudgment seizure of property in violation of the four-
teenth amendment, a contractual penalty, and an adhesion provision.
The "Due-on" Clause: California Cases
Prior to Tucker
Most simply stated, a "due-on" clause is a provision in a loan
agreement wherein the borrower agrees that if he alienates or encum-
bers his secured property, the lender can demand immediate repay-
ment of the full amount of the loan. The "due-on" clause has been
in existence for many years as a security device,6 but its current wide-
spread use is largely the result of recent tight money conditions, since
it is a means by which lenders can improve their loan portfolios. 7 The
first California case to address the subject of the due-on-sale clause,
Coast Bank v. Minderhout,s was decided in 1964. In Coast Bank,
the borrowers bought property and financed it with a bank loan,
covenanting not to transfer the property, absent the bank's consent,
purchase. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 457 (1974). It is not known how many of these mortgage loans
are held subject to "due-on-sale" type provisions.
6. Goddard, Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts, 31 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1932).
7. Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in
California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6
U.S.F.L. REV. 267 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bonanno].
8. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964). For discussion of the
Coast Bank case, see Fred, Analysis of Coast Bank vs. Minderhout and Cases Following
It, 4 J. BEVERLY HILLS B. ASs'N 21 (1970); Gerstenfeld, The "Due-on-Sale" Clause-
Time for a Change, 4 J. BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N 11 (1970); Levitt, The Effect of
Transfers by Death or Operation of Law on "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 4 J. BEVERLY HILLS
B. ASS'N 16 (1970); Valensi, The Due on Sale Clause-A Dissenting Opinion, 45
L.A.B. BULL. 121 (1970). Coogan, Kripke and Weiss argue that Coast Bank, when read
in the broadest possible manner, might be read to hold that a negative pledge creates an
equitable mortgage which can be foreclosed by the promisee in an action against the
transferee of the property. Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9:
Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge
Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 HARv. L. REV. 229, 264 (1965).
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until the loan had been paid. Buyers later breached the covenant, and
the bank demanded immediate payment of all of the outstanding debt.
In holding that the loan agreement9 did not constitute an unlawful
restraint on alienation,'0 the court adopted the minority doctrine con-
cerming restraints." According to this doctrine, a restraint is valid,
provided that it is reasonable under the circumstances.' 2 The majority
common law view had been that most restraints on alienation were pre-
sumptively void.'"
Following Coast Bank, several appellate courts upheld the due-on-
sale provisions before them without much discussion of whether or not
the provision constituted a reasonable restraint on alienation. In Jones
v. Sacramento Savings and Loan Association,'4 decided in 1967, the
court simply disposed of the issue by declaring in a footnote that as
the result of Coast Bank, the due-on-sale clause was valid in Califor-
nia.15 The court did not discuss whether or not the lender had to act
reasonably in exercising the clause.' 6 The court in Wilson v. Inland
9. The court in Coast Bank construed the loan agreement to be an "equitable
mortgage." Thus, the case did not deal with a due-on-sale clause in a deed of trust and
promissory note. Miller and Starr define an equitable mortgage as "one which is created
by a court of equity rather than by the formal act of the parties. Under certain
circumstances the court will determine that equity, fairness and justice demand that a
security device be enforced between two parties despite the fact that no formal mortgage
has been created or that its attempted creation was defective." 1 MiLLER & STARR, supra
note 4, at 395. In Coast Bank, the doctrine of equitable mortgages was applied even
though the instrument in question did not show on its face that the parties intended to
make the property security for the indebtedness. See, e.g., Fred, Analysis of Coast Bank
vs. Minderhout and Cases Following It, 4 J. BEVERLY HtLLs B. Ass'N 21 (1970).
10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1954).
11. See generally Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints
on Alienation, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1173 (1959).
12. "A restraint is reasonable under the circumstances if the particular purpose
behind its imposition outweighs its effect in terms of the actual hindering of alienability
of the particular property involved." Id. at 1177. In holding that California should adopt
the "minority doctrine," Justice Traynor noted that the California courts had already
recognized several property interests as justifying reasonable restraints on alienation.
Among such interests were spendthrift trusts, leases for a term of years, life estates,
corporate stock ownership, and executory land contracts. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61
Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
13. See, e.g., 6 AMmuc, LAW OF PROPERTY, § 26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 6 R.
POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, § 843; Manning, The Development of Restraints
on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REv. 373 (1935). The classic work on the
common law treatment of restraints is J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895).
14. 248 Cal. App. 2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1967).
15. Id. at 527 n.3, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
16. The court did state that the due-on-sale clause gave the lender several options:
(1) the lender could elect to continue the borrower (a subdivider) as its primary obligor;
(2) the lender could permit a borrower of satisfactory credit to assume the construction
Mortgage Company17 sustained the right of a lender to require modifi-
cation of the loan as consideration for its waiver of acceleration. 8 In
Hellbaum v. Lytton Savings and Loan Association,9 the court held that
a lender's right to accelerate upon transfer by the trustor-obligor, and
its right to impose a fee for prepayment, did not constitute an unlawful
restraint on alienation.2"
The 1969 decision in Cherry v. Home Savings and Loan Associa-
tion2' helped explain why the courts were willing to support due-on-
sale clauses. In Cherry, the Wickershims executed a promissory note
secured by a deed of trust on certain real property. Both instruments
contained due-on-sale clauses. Subsequently, plaintiff Cherry ex-
pressed a desire to buy the property. A contract was proposed under
which Cherry would purchase the property subject to the lender's se-
curity interest and the Wickershims would remain primarily liable.
The lender, however, refused to consent to the sale unless Cherry
agreed to pay an assumption fee and assume all of Wickershims's in-
debtedness at a higher rate of interest. Cherry agreed under protest
and filed suit against the lender.
In upholding the actions of the savings and loan association, the
court proposed two justifications for the due-on-sale clause. First, the
court stated that automatic acceleration is justified to reduce the lend-
er's risk of loss caused by the transfer of the property to an irrespon-
sible third party. 22  In the case at hand, however, the lender never ar-
gued that Cherry was a poor security risk.23
loan; or (3) the lender could choose to exercise the power of sale conferred by its deed
of trust, putting the subordinate lienholder under economic pressure to bid in the
property. Id. at 527, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 745. It should be noted that the situations in Jones
and Coast Bank differed, in that Coast Bank did not involve a traditional deed of trust.
This distinction, however, was not dispositive.
17. Civil No. 8636 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Jan. 18, 1968).
18. Note, however, that unpublished opinions of the court of appeal have no value
as precedent. CAL. R. CT. (MISCELLANEOUS) 977 (West 1975).
19. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969).
20. The holding of the case is criticized in Comment, The Case for Relief from
Due-on-Sale Provisions: A Note to Hellbaum v. Lytton Savings and Loan Association,
22 HAsriNrs L.J. 431 (1971). Cases dealing with whether a prepayment fee alone
constitutes an unlawful penalty or unlawful usury are cited in notes 182-83 infra. See
also Hassen v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civil No. 30374 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., filed
Jan. 8, 1968) discussed in Comment, Due on Sale and Due o,, Encumbrance Clauses in
California, 7 LOYOLA L. REv. (Los ANGELES) 306, 308-09 (1974).
21. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
22. Id. at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
23. In fact, even if Cherry had been a poor security risk, the lender's security
would not have been impaired. As the Wickershims argued (correctly, if not persuasive-
ly), they would remain personally liable on the obligation, even after a sale to Cherry.
Id. at 577, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
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The second justification given for the due-on-sale clause was that
it is necessary to enable the lender to maintain its loan portfolio at the
current market rate of interest. The court noted that when interest
rates are high, the lender runs the risk that they will drop. If they
do, the borrower can refinance his debt at a lower rate, pay off the
loan, and leave the lender with money to loan at a less favorable inter-
rest rate. On the other hand, when interest rates are low, the lender
risks losing the benefit of a later increase in rates.2 4  The due-on-sale
clause helps remedy this problem by permitting the lender to call a loan
due in the event the borrower transfers the security.
25
The decision in Cherry reflected the California courts' concern
about the harsh effects that tight money conditions were having on in-
stitutional lenders. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the Cherry
court acted appropriately in sanctioning the lenders' use of a due-on-
sale clause solely for the purpose of procuring higher interest rates.26
La Sala: First Distinction Between Due-on-Sale
and Due-on-Encumbrance Clause
The reasoning employed in Cherry and the other cases upholding
the due-on-sale clause was reexamined in La Sala v. American Savings
and Loan Association.2 7  In La Sala, the lender threatened to accele-
rate2 8 when the trustor-obligors encumbered their property with a
second deed of trust. The California Supreme Court ruled that auto-
matic acceleration could not be justified under the circumstances.
In its decision, the court distinguished due-on-encumbrance from
due-on-sale clauses.29 It noted that a trustor-obligor who makes a
junior encumbrance retains his title to the property and usually retains
24. These propositions may be illustrated in the following manner. Suppose A
borrows $10,000 from B, repayable in 25 years at 10% interest per annum. After one
year, the market rate of interest drops to 9%. A can borrow $10,000 at 9% from C and
use the money to pay off his loan from B (A may also have to pay a prepayment fee). B
gets his $10,000 back, but now he can obtain only a 9% return (the current rate) when
he loans it to a third party.
25. See 276 Cal. App. 2d at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
26. See text accompanying notes 126-34 infra.
27. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
28, Acceleration is the term used to describe the process of calling a loan
immediately due.
29. 5 Cal. 3d at 879, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 858. The Tucker court
explained the distinction: "The cases and the literature in this area of the law generally
refer to acceleration clauses triggered by sale or encumbrance according to the particular
triggering event involved in the case in question. Thus, even though a clause may permit
acceleration either upon sale or upon encumbrance, it is normally referred to as a 'due-
on-sale' clause when the particular case involves sale and a 'due-on-encumbrance' clause
when the case involves encumbrance." Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d at
631 n.1, 526 P.2d at 1170, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
possession, as well. Thus, although the creation of a junior lien by
a borrower might increase the risk of future foreclosure, this risk is not
sufficient to permit a lender to have uncontrolled discretion to acceler-
ate. Rather, a lender may enforce a due-on-encumbrance clause only
when reasonably necessary to protect his security.
30
The court rejected the argument that automatic acceleration under
a due-on-encumbrance clause could be justified to minimize the risks
imposed on the lender by rising interest rates. The court noted that
this argument, which had been voiced in the Cherry case, was appeal-
ing as applied to a sale of the property because the sale terms usually
provide for payment of the prior trust deed. A junior encumbrance,
on the other hand, represents only a small fraction of a borrower's
equity in the property, and it rarely provides the borrower with the
means to discharge the balance secured by the trust deed. Conse-
quently, if a lender could automatically enforce a due-on-encumbrance
clause, the borrower would be restrained from executing any junior en-
cumbrance unless he were able to accede to the lender's demand that
he immediately pay off his entire debt on the first trust deed at current
high interest rates. 3
In direct contrast to its holding with respect to the due-on-encum-
brance clause, the La Sala court suggested that lenders might be able
to exercise due-on-sale clauses automatically.12 The court based this
different treatment on the reasoning that a trustor-obligor who sells
his property to a third party usually passes title and possession. As a
result, he arguably has little interest in assuring that the property is
maintained.33
30. 5 Cal. 3d at 882, 489 P.2d at 1124-25, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61. In discussing
the meaning of "security," the court used the criteria set forth in the Cherry case: "If a
borrower were able to sell the security without concern for the debt, he may take the
proceeds of the sale, leaving for parts unknown, and the new owner of the property
might permit it to run down and depreciate." Id. at 879-80, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal.
Rptr. at 859. The court, however, did not limit its definition of "security risk" to the
mere danger of physical deterioration of the property due to default. It proceeded to
cite in a footnote Professor Hetland's argument that the protection of security includes
the protection against "moral risks"-i.e. the increased danger, upon the making of a
third party sale, that the lender will have to resort to the property due to default. Id. at
880 n.16, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859. In the Tucker case, the court clearly
included both of the above-mentioned elements in its definition of security. See text
accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
31. 5 Cal. 3d at 880-81 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1123-24, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
32. "Following our ruling upholding reasonable restraints on alienation, we have
distinguished the due-on-sale from the due-on-encumbrance clauses; we have concluded
that the lender may insist upon the automatic performance of the due-on-sale clause
because such a provision is necessary to the lender's security. We have decided, however,
that the power lodged in the lender by the due-on-encumbrance clause can claim no such
mechanical justification." Id. at 883-84, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
33. Id. at 879-80, 489 P.2d at 1122-23, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59.
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This position has been severely criticized.3 4  It has been observed
that the third party buyer may, in fact, be a better security risk than
the trustor-obligor.Y5 Moreover, the trustor-obligor who sells to a third
party often remains liable on his obligation under his first trust deed;-6
therefore, he has an incentive to make certain that the property is
maintained and that all payments are made. Finally, there is no more
reason why lenders should be able to accelerate on sale than on encum-
brance, if the sole purpose of the acceleration is to keep the lending
portfolio at the current rate of interest.
37
Tucker and the Installment Contract of Sale
The La Sala case left many questions unanswered. The court
clearly determined that the trustor-obligor could encumber his property
with a junior lien without fearing that the lender would automatically
accelerate; instead, the lender would have to be prepared to prove that
the security was impaired by the second lien. The decision also di-
rected that if the trustor-obligor made an outright sale to a third party,
the lender could demand immediate payment without showing any im-
pairment.
Nevertheless, a trustor-obligor might engage in many transactions
with respect to the property which would constitute neither junior liens
nor outright sale.35 Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Association
was the first case to address itself to this gray area. The facts of the
case were as follows. The Tuckers purchased some property for
$11,400. They made a down payment of $4,000 and financed the bal-
ance of $7,400 by a loan from defendant Lassen Savings and Loan As-
sociation. To obtain the loan, the Tuckers had to sign a promissory
34. See, e.g., Bonanno, supra note 7; Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints
on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REV. 747 (1973);
Warren, Is the Practice of Raising the Interest Rate in Return for Not Exercising an
Acceleration Clause on Assumption of a Mortgage Illegal in Texas as a Restraint on
Alienation?, 13 So. TEx. LU. 296 (1971); Comment, Mortgages-A Catalogue and
Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale"
Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REV. 485 (1973); Comment, Applying the Brakes to Acceleration
Clauses: Controlling Their Misuse in Real Property Secured Transactions, 9 CAL. WEST.
L. REv. 514 (1973).
35. Bonanno, supra note 7, at 280-91. It should be noted that one of the traditional
objections to restraints on alienation is that they discourage improvements on land. "A
landowner will be reluctant to make improvements on land that he cannot sell during the
period of restraint." 6 AMEMCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
36. See Bonanno, supra note 7, at 287. For cases in which the trustor-obligor does
not remain liable under his trust deed see notes 135-144 infra.
37. See Bonnano, supra note 7, at 284.
38. See text accompanying notes 96-124 infra.
note secured by a deed of trust. Both instruments contained "due-on"
clauses covering sale and encumbrance.
3 9
Soon after purchasing the property, the Tuckers rented it to the
Nolls on a month-to-month tenancy. The lenders were informed of
the situation, but made no effort to enforce the "due-on" clause. Sev-
eral months later, plaintiffs entered into an installment land contract
with the Nolls. The contract provided that the Tuckers would retain
legal title to the property until the full purchase price had been paid.
Upon learning of the installment land contract, the lenders de-
cided to enforce the "due-on" provision. They demanded that the
Tuckers pay the unpaid principal as well as $230 in prepayment fees,
but the Tuckers were unable to pay this amount or obtain substitute
financing. The savings and loan association then offered to permit the
Nolls to assume the Tuckers's loan at a higher rate of interest, provided
that the Tuckers executed a quitclaim deed.40 The Tuckers executed
the deed, but brought suit against Lassen for the difference between
what the Nolls owed them under the installment land contract and what
they in turn owed Lassen on the original loan."
In its decision, the supreme court first discussed its previous hold-
ings in Coast Bank and La Sala and then announced a new test which
would govern its enforcement of a "due-on" clause in particular circum-
stances. The test requires the balancing of two factors: the extent to
which the exercise of the clause is justified under the circumstances,
and the actual quantum of restraint which the exercise of the clause
imposes on the trustor-obligor. Applying this test, the court concluded
that Lassen's exercise of the "due-on" clause constituted an invalid re-
straint on alienation.42
The First Factor
The first factor which the court considered essentially concerns
the lender's interest in protecting the secured property. In Coast
39. The "due-on" clause incorporated by reference into the deed of trust read: 'TO
PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS DEED OF TRUST, TRUSTOR AGREES...
(12) That if the Trustor shall sell, convey, or alienate, or further encumber said prop-
erty, or any part thereof, or any interest therein, or shall be divested of his title or any
interest therein in any manner or way, whether voluntary or involuntary, all obligations
secured hereby, irrespective of the maturity date expressed in any note evidencing the
same, at the option of the Beneficiary and without demand or notice, shall immediately
become due and payable." 12 Cal. 3d at 632-33 n.3, 526 P.2d at 1171, 116 Cal. Rptr. at
635.
40. "A quitclaim deed transfers to the grantee all of the right, title and interest
which the grantor had at the time he executed and delivered the deed and which is
capable of being conveyed by a deed." 2 MILLER & STARR, supra note 2, at 501.
41. 12 Cal. 3d at 632-33, 526 P.2d at 1171, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
42. Id. at 640, 526 P.2d at 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
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Bank, the court declared that it would permit only reasonable restraints
on alienation. In La Sala, the court held that the exercise of a due-
on-encumbrance clause would be reasonable only if the lender could
show that the trustor-obligor had endangered the security of the first
lien.
4 3
In Tucker, the court decided that the same standard should apply
when the trustor-obligor made an installment contract of sale with a
third party. Certainly, there are differences between a junior encum-
brance and an installment sale. In the former transaction, possession
of the property generally remains in the hands of the trustor-obligor,
whereas in the latter, possession often passes to the third party buyer.44
Nevertheless, the court held that the mere fact that the trustor-obligor
relinquishes possession after making an installment contract would not,
in itself, justify acceleration by the lender.45
Instead, acceleration is appropriate only if the lender demon-
strates a substantial threat to one of his "legitimate interests" in the
security. Those interests include the preservation of the security from
waste or depreciation and the protection against the "moral risks" of
having to resort to the security upon default.4 6  The court illustrated
these legitimate interests in the following manner:
Thus, for example, if the beneficiary can show that the party in
possession under the installment land contract is, or is likely to be,
conducting himself with respect to the property in a manner which
will probably result in a significant wasting or other impairment
of the security, he may properly insist upon enforcement of the
"due-on" clause. Similarly, ,if the beneficiary can show that the
prospects of default on the part of the vendor (requiring the incon-
venience of resort to the security) are significantly enhanced in the
particular situation, such circumstances might constitute a sufficient
43. Miller and Starr state: "Many institutional deeds of trust provide that the
trustor cannot impose junior liens on the secured property. The lenders justify this
prohibition with the argument that additional encumbrances will reduce the trustor's
ability to comply with the provisions of the senior lien. The argument is somewhat
circuitous in that the lender can thereby declare the trustor in default because the
additional obligation increases the probability that he will default." 1 MILLER & STARR,
supra note 2, at 126 (Supp. 1974).
44. See text accompanying notes 62-77 infra.
I 45. In a footnote, the court noted that the lender's concern that the Tuckers
remain in possession in order to prevent waste and depreciation seemed "somewhat
exaggerated" in view of the fact that the due-on-clause is not normally exercised when
the secured property is leased to another by the trustor. 12 Cal. 3d at 638 n.8, 526 P.2d
at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
46. See Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the
Law, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 151, 170 (1965). See also Comment, Debtor-Selection Provi-
sions Found in Trust Deeds and the Extent of Their Enforceability in the Courts, 35
S. CAL. L. Rlv. 475, 482-85 (1962).
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justification for enforcement of the clause despite its restraining ef-
fect. 47
The Second Factor
The second factor in the new test announced in Tucker is the
quantum of restraint which an exercise of the "due-on" clause imposes
on the trustor-obligor. In La Sala, the court rejected the argument that
automatic exercise of a due-on-encumbrance clause was necessary to
enable the lender to maintain its portfolio at the current rate of inter-
est. 48  The court observed that when the trustor-obligor makes a junior
encumbrance, he rarely receives enough money to be able to pay off
his obligation under the first lien. Thus, the exercise of the due-on-
encumbrance clause creates a substantial risk that the trustor-obligor
will lose his property.
In Tucker, the court extended this reasoning to the situation in
which the trustor-obligor makes an installment land contract. In such
a case, the trustor-obligor normally receives a relatively small down
payment upon execution of the contract with the remainder of the pur-
chase price to be paid through monthly installments.49 This down pay-
ment, like the proceeds of the junior encumbrance involved in La Sala,
is often insufficient to enable him to complete his obligation under the
first lien."0 Consequently, the exercise of a due-on-sale clause can sub-
stantially restrain his ability to alienate.
Balancing of the Two Factors in the Test
The court never directly discussed how these two factors should
be balanced in determining whether the exercise of a "due-on" clause,
in a particular situation, constitutes an unlawful restraint on alienation.
One of the footnotes of the opinion5 ' did, however, provide some indi-
cation of the proper methods.
A few hypothetical examples may be helpful in understanding
how the court appears to have intended the Tucker test to be applied.
Suppose a trustor-obligor has entered into an installment contract, and
the lender wishes to accelerate. To satisfy the first factor in the
Tucker test, the lender must establish that the trustor-obligor's install-
ment sale to the third party poses a threat to the lender's legitimate
interests in the security. It should be recalled that these "legitimate
interests" include both the risk that waste will be committed on the
47. 12 Cal. 3d at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
48. See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
49. But see text accompanying notes 62-77 inlra.
50. See 12 Cal. 3d at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
51. Id. at 639 n.9, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639,
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property and the risk that the trustor-vendor will default.52  The court
will then weigh these risks against the actual rstraint which the lender's
exercise the "due-on" clause, even if the lender could show that the third
ability to alienate.
Suppose, for example, that the third party buyer has paid the trus-
tor-obligor only a small down payment, promising to pay the balance
at a later time. The court would probably not permit the lender to
exercise the "due-on" clause, even if the lender could show that the third
party buyer was not so good a credit risk as the trustor-obligor. 53 After
all, the trustor-obligor in this situation retains a substantial incentive
to prevent default; if a default occurs, he could lose the property
through a forced sale,54 and he would retain only the buyer's small
down payment as compensation. Similarly, should the new buyer com-
mit waste, the trustor-obligor could be held liable,55 and he would have
only the buyer's small down payment from which to satisfy an adverse
judgment. Hence, it is likely that the trustor-obligor would use his best
efforts to prevent both default and the commission of waste.
On the other hand, if the trustor-obligor has received a large down
payment from the new buyer (or if he has received a small down pay-
ment and a large percentage of the balance due), the court would
probably be more willing to permit the enforcement of the "due-on"
clause. In this instance, the trustor-obligor has less incentive to pre-
vent default: should a default occur, he might lose the property
through a forced sale,5 6 but he would be able to retain the buyer's lar-
ger down payment as compensation. In addition, since the trustor-ob-
ligor has received a large down payment from the new buyer, it is more
likely that he would be able to discharge the balance which he owes
the lender on the original loan, should the lender demand immediate
52. See text accompanying notes 66-77 infra.
53. See 12 Cal. 3d at 639 n.9, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
54. Section 725a of the California Code of Civil Procedure gives the beneficiary or
trustee of a trust deed the right to seek judicial foreclosure, should he choose not to
exercise his power of sale. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 725a (West 1955). See Comment,
Recent Legislation on Trust Deeds and Power of Sale Mortgages, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 471
(1933). Civil Procedure Code section 580d, however, generally precludes a deficiency
judgment in such cases. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580d (West 1955).
55. See note 114 infra.
56. Since the Tucker case, some have tried to evade the impact of a due-on-sale
clause by having the seller receive down payment equal to his equity in the property and
then enter into an installment sale contract with the buyer for the balance due in an
amount equal to that owed to the original lender on the deed of trust. Such a transaction
may resemble the transaction involved in the Tucker case, but it would probably be
subject to automatic exercise of the due-on-sale clause unless the seller were still
personally liable on the original note and deed of trust in the event of a deficiency
judgment. Interview with Jack F. Bonnano at Hastings College of the Law, July 11
1975.
payment. Hence, the quantum of restraint on alienation imposed by
the "due-on" clause would be less substantial than that in the situation
described in the previous paragraph.
Finally, the court indicated that if the trustor-obligor has received
full payment from the buyer through complete payment of the balance
due, the lender should have an automatic right to accelerate. 57 At this
point, in the court's view, the trustor-obligor would have no incentive
to prevent default or to make certain that the property is kept free from
waste:"
As long as the trustor-vendor's equitable interest in the security re-
mains significant, he retains a real incentive to prevent default, and
the credit standing of his vendee would not offer sufficient justifica-
tion for enforcement of the "due-on" clause. However, as the
trustor-vendor's equitable interest diminishes through payment by
the vendee, his incentive to prevent default-as well as his incen-
tive to prevent damage to or waste of the security-also diminishes,
until the moment when his entire equitable interest has passed to
the vendee. At this point, the propriety of enforcing the clause is
clear. The trustor-vendor will now have been provided with the
means to discharge the balance secured by the trust deed, so that
the quantum of actual restraint on alienation caused by enforce-
ment at this point will be minimal. Moreover, the beneficiary will
no longer have the benefit of the built-in incentive to prompt pay-
ment and preservation of the property which the trustor-vendor's
equitable interest provides. Accordingly, in a normal case the
lender will be permitted to insist on enforcement of the "due-on"
clause when the trustor-vendor's entire equitable interest in the
security has passed to the vendee.59
Application of the Test
This balancing test applied very well to the facts of the Tucker
case. First, the lenders failed to establish that the Nolls (third party
buyers) were a greater security risk than the Tuckers. In fact, the
lenders made no investigation of the Nolls's credit standing or the man-
ner in which they were maintaining the property.6" Second, a large
57. 12 Cal. 3d at 639 n.9, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639. It should be
noted, however, that in footnote 7 of the opinion, the court specifically declined to rule
on the validity of the exercise of a due-on-sale clause when the trustor-obligor makes an
outright sale to a third party. The distinction between an outright sale and an installment
sale in which the buyer has completed all of his installments seems illusive to the
author.
58. It is doubtful that the court's observation could properly be applied to a case in
which the original deed of trust is not subject to anti-deficiency legislation. In such a
case, the trustor-obligor would remain liable for any waste committed by the third party
buyer and could be sued following a default. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
59. 12 Cal. 3d at 639 n.9, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
60. Id. at 640 n.11, 526 P.2d at 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 640. In an amicus brief on
plaintiff's behalf, it was contended that the Tuckers told Lassen of their intent to lease
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quantum of restraint would have resulted if the lenders had been per-
mitted to exercise the due-on-sale clause. The Tuckers had received
only a small down payment from the Nolls, and owed almost the entire
obligation on the first lien.
61
Although the balancing test applied well in Tucker, it is not cer-
tain how well it would apply to other real property security transactions.
The potential applicability of the test is the subject of a large portion
of this note.
Questions Raised by the Tucker Test
In several respects, the meaning of the Tucker decision is unclear.
The court did not indicate whether the Tucker test is to govern all types
of installment sales or merely those of the conventional type. More-
over, in its use of the term "equitable interest" and "equitable con-
tract," the court somewhat obfuscated the meaning of the opinion.
Installment Sale
Although the court indicated that the newly announced test would
apply whenever the trustor-obligor enters into an installment sale con-
tract with a third party,62 it did not define what it meant by an install-
ment sale.
In the usual installment sale situation, the buyer tenders an initial
sum and completes his obligation by making periodic payments which
include part of the principal as well as interest on the unpaid balance.
63
As a result, the buyer's equity64 in the property increases as time
the property to others. Prior to calling the loan, Lassen did not inspect the premises to
determine if waste had been committed and never obtained any copies of the contract of
sale between the Tuckers and Nolls to determine what interest, if any, had been
transferred to the Nolls. Brief for Jack F. Bonnano as Amicus Curiae at 10, Tucker v.
Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). It
should also be noted that the lender subsequently accepted a note and deed of trust from
the Nolls for an amount greater than that provided in the Tuckers' note.
61. Plaintiff's lawyer noted that the Tuckers borrowed $7,400 to finance the
purchase. Because of the loan fees, they signed a trust deed for $7,800. When Lassen
called the loan fifteen months later, it demanded payment of the remaining principal on
the note plus a prepayment charge of $229.32, bringing Lassen's total demand to
$7,904.47-some $104.47 more than the original note signed by the Tuckers and $504.47
more than the Tuckers had borrowed. Brief of Respondents in Answer to Brief for
California Savings & Loan League as Amicus Curiae at 5, Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
62. 12 Cal. 3d at 632, 526 P.2d at 1170, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
63. See J. PUGH & W. HPPAKA, CALIFORNIA REAL EsTATE FINANcE 190 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as PUGH & HIPPAKA].
64. Here, the term "equity" is being used to denote the amount of principal which
the buyer has paid. But see text accompanying notes 78-85 infra.
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passes. Nevertheless, the seller retains title to the property as security
for performance by the buyer, and he does not usually relinquish title
until the full purchase price has been paid. 5
It is possible, however, that a trustor-obligor will enter into a less
conventional form of installment sale. Consider, for example, the term
loan. Although this type of transaction was more common fifty years
ago, it is occasionally used today. 6  Under the term loan, the buyer
is not required to pay the principal on the debt until the due date; dur-
ing the term of the note, he pays only the interest on the debt. Title
may pass to the buyer at the beginning of the term, rather than on the
date that the principal is due.
67
The term loan is an installment sale,6" but only the interest is paid
in installments. Certain problems occur when one attempts to apply
the rationale of the Tucker case to this type of arrangement. On one
hand, since title69 passes from the trustor-obligor to the buyer at the
beginning of the transaction, one might conclude that the lender should
be able to accelerate automatically, especially if the trust deed is sub-
ject to anti-deficiency limitations. 70  After all, if the trustor-obligor
should default, the lender might not be able to recover anything against
him; hence, it might be argued that the trustor-obligor has no real in-
It should be observed that "equity" also refers to the difference between the fair mar-
ket value of the property and the balance due on any deeds of trust or other encum-
brances on the property. This meaning of "equity" would be significant when the prop-
erty has appreciated in value since the date the sales contract was signed, because the
buyer would be entitled to all the appreciation in value.
65. 1 MILLER & STARR, supra note 2, at 262.
66. PUGH & HIPPAKA, supra note 63, at 189.
67. Id.
68. Compare the term loan with a lease-option, in which the third party rents the
property and has the option to buy it at the end of a number of years. If the trustor-
obligor entered into a lease-option, the lender could not accelerate. Note, for example,
the following language from the respondent's brief in the Tucker case: "Had the
plaintiffs [Tuckers] and the Nolls entered into an agreement whereby the Nolls leased
the property in question for a sufficient number of years to pay to the appellants the sum
of $11,500 at the rate of $110.00 a month, plus 8% interest on the declining balance
. . . with the further provision that at the end of the lease the Nolls would have the
option to buy the property for $1.00, they would have had essentially the same
agreement as the one entered into here. Apparently, if they had called their agreement a
lease-option rather than a contract of sale, there would have been no problem." Brief for
Respondent at 10, Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169,
116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
69. Note here that the title being passed is technically not legal title. See note 2,
supra.
70. See text accompanying notes 135-39 infra. Basically, this legislation provides
that in certain circumstances a seller is prevented from seeking a personal judgment
against a buyer, following a foreclosure. Rather, he must look to the security for recovery
of the obligation,
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centive to pay off the loan. On the other hand, the trustor-obligor
maintains his equity in the property until the due date, since the buyer
does not pay the full principal until then.7' Therefore one might con-
clude that the lender should not be able to accelerate automatically
when a term loan is made, since the trustor-obligor retains a substantial
interest in the property until the due date, even though he has relin-
quished title.7 2  In short, the court in Tucker failed to specify which
interest, full title or the mere right to obtain full title, must be passed
from the trustor-obligor to the buyer before -the lender will be able
to accelerate automatically.
73
Similar problems arise when the installment sale is made by means
of a blanket trust deed. A blanket trust deed is often used by de-
velopers who have purchased a single tract of land with the intention
of subdividing it.7 4  The lien on the property provides that upon the
buyer's payment of designated amounts the creditor will release title
to certain portions of the property.7 5 For example, suppose that a
71. It is possible that the buyer may pay some principal, in the form of a down
payment.
72.. Note that the term loan could be considered a variation of a "balloon
payment" loan. The balloon payment loan is frequently used in real estate transactions
when the lender wants to make a relatively short term real estate loan (ten years, for
instance) but the buyer-borrower is not strong enough financially to pay the entire
principal in ten years. With a balloon payment loan, the unpaid principal at the end of
the term is renewed (or rolled-over) by the lender at whatever is the current interest rate
at the time of renewal. Many non-institutional lenders use this device to secure an
opportunity to raise interest rates at the end of the short term of the loan without the use
of a due-on-sale clause. The borrower typically cannot refinance with another lender and
is quite willing to renew the loan at the current higher rate of interest as to the part of
the principal amount of the note that is still unpaid. It would appear that the same
problems raised by an attempt to apply the Tucker test to a term loan would be raised in
the balloon payment loan situation.
73. Note that the second factor in the Tucker test (quantum of restraint on the
trustor-obligor's ability to alienate) would work basically the same way in the term loan
as it would in the conventional installment sale: as time passed, the amount of restraint
on the trustor-obligor's ability to alienate would decrease.
Suppose that the trustor-obligor (T-O) borrows $10,000 from a lender (L) for the
purchase of Blackacre. The trust deed which T-O signs contains a due-on-sale clause. T-
o then sells the property to a third party buyer (B) for $11,000, financed by a term
loan. In the loan agreement, B agrees to pay $1,000 down and to pay $10,000 at the end
of twenty-five years. During the interim period, B agrees to pay T-O the accruing interest
on the loan (suppose this amount totals $1,000 per annum).
Each year, T-O will receive interest payments from B. Therefore, as time passes,
and T-O accumulates B's payments, it would be increasingly likely that T-O could pay L,
should he exercise the due-on-sale provision and call the loan immediately due. Thus, one
could say that the quantum of restraint on T-O's ability to alienate would decrease as
time passed, even though T-O would not be receiving payments on the principal of his
loan to B.
74. PUGH & HIPPAKA, supra note 63, at 186.
75. Id.
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trustor-obligor (developer) sells ten acres of land to buyer for $10,000
(with $2,000 down payment), and takes back a second trust deed.
The trust deed states that the buyer must pay $1,500 before he receives
title to one acre, and $2,500 before he receives title to two acres. 76
The buyer will receive title to all ten acres only when he pays the entire
debt. Once again, it is uncertain whether or not the opinion in Tucker
was intended to apply to this type of installment sale.
77
"Equitable Interest"
A second difficulty with the Tucker opinion is the court's frequent
use of the term "equitable interest." For example, in one previously
cited passage, the opinion reads: "As long as trustor-vendor's equi-
table interest in the security remains significant, he retains a real incen-
tive to prevent default, and the credit standing of his vendee would
not afford sufficient justification for enforcement of the 'due-on'
clause."78
Unfortunately, the court appears to have confused the term "equi-
table interest" with "equity." The Restatement of Property defines an
equitable interest in land as one which has it origins in the principles,
standards and rules developed by the courts of chancery.79  Professor
Powell has pointed out that legal and equitable interests in land differ
in their methods of creation, methods of enforcement, constituent con-
tent, and methods of termination.80
In a land sale contract, the term "equitable interest" has been
given a special meaning. As soon as such a contract is created by the
owner's acceptance of the buyer's offer to purchase, the buyer is said
to have an "equitable interest" in the property."' In other words, the
buyer has a right to the land and, as far as equity is concerned, owns
it.82 Thus, in a conventional installment land contract, even though
the seller does not relinquish title until a future date, the buyer still
76. This type of arrangement gives the developer added security. For example,
after one year, buyer will owe $6,500, but the land still subject to the lien will be worth
$9,000. Id.
77. Note also that the blanket trust deed may raise additional questions, in view of
new statutory subdivision requirements. For example, when a blanket trust deed is
involved, would the seller be required to conform to the statutes at the time of sale, or at
the time of the partial release or reconveyance of the property to the trustor or
mortgagor? The statutes make no express provision. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
66478.1-.14 (West Supp. 1975) with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11000.1-11030 (West
1964 & Supp. 1975).
78. Id. at 639 n.9, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
79. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 6(3) (1936).
80. 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 99, at 371-72 (1969).
81. PUGH & HIPPAKA, supra note 63, at 163.
82. Id. at 164.
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has "equitable ownership" of the property for the duration of the con-
tract. 83
In Tucker, Justice Sullivan wrote that as a trustor-obligor's "equi-
table interest" in the secured property diminishes through payments by
the buyer, the court should be more willing to allow the lender to ac-
celerate automatically under the "due-on" clause.8 4  What does the
court mean by "equitable interest"? Certainly, the court is using the
expression in a different sense than that discussed in the paragraph
above. After all, the buyer has just as much right to the property
("equitable interest") when he makes his down payment as he does
after he has made several installment payments. Thus, if one takes
the term "equitable interest" to mean a party's right to the property,
the "equitable interest" of the buyer does not increase as he completes
more installments, nor does the seller's equitable interest decrease.
The court in Tucker seems, however, to be using the expression
"equitable interest" to mean the difference between the fair market
value of the property and the principal balance still due on the contract
or deed of trust. In real estate terminology, this amount is usually
called "equity." 85 In other words, as a buyer completes an increasing
number of his installment payments, normally his "equity" in the prop-
erty increases.86 At the same time, the trustor-obligor's "equity" in
the property decreases commensurately. In this note, it has been as-
sumed that the court in Tucker used "equitable interest" to mean
"equity." It is unfortunate, however, that the court did not articulate
more precisely the meaning of its terminology.
'"xecutory Contract"
A further difficulty with the Tucker opinion is the court's use of
the expression "executory contract" when stating the holding of the
case. The paragraph in question reads as follows:
In the instant case we confront the question whether the lender
may automatically enforce a "due-on" clause when the trustor-
obligor has entered into an installment land contract covering all
or some of the property securing the loan. As will appear, we
have concluded that such an executory contract does not neces-
sarily, and in the circumstances of the case at bench in fact did not,
justify the enforcement of the clause.87
83. 1 MILLER & STARR, supra note 2, at 262.
84. 12 Cal. 3d at 639 n.9, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
85. See note 64 supra.
86. It is assumed that the installment contract is of the conventional type. As
discused previously, if the installment contract were made as a term loan, the install-
ment payments would not include principal. Hence, the buyer's equity in the property
would not increase as time passes. See text accompanying notes 66-73, supra.
87. 12 Cal. 3d at 632, 526 P.2d at 1170, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
It is not clear why the court chose to use the expression "executory con-
tract" or whether it would rule differently in the case of an executed
contract.
The California Civil Code states that an executed contract is one
whose object is fully performed. All other contracts are deemed ex-
ecutory. 88 An executed contract gives rise to many rights and obliga-
tions which are not present when the contract is merely executory. For
example, one case89 has held that the California anti-deficiency stat-
ute9° applies only when a contract of sale is fully executed. The im-
portance of the anti-deficiency legislation in determining whether a
lender should be able to accelerate under a due-on-sale clause will be
discussed later in this note.
The determination of whether a land sale contract is executed or
executory may hinge on whether title has passed from buyer to seller.
For example, in Smith v. Allen,9 the court held that when a vendor
conveys property to the vendee and takes back a deed of trust, the con-
tract of sale has been fully executed, since title has passed. 92  Based
on similar reasoning, another case held that when a party makes a down
payment on some property, goes into possession, and agrees to com-
plete his obligation through installment payments, the contract is still
executory, since title has not passed.93 It is thus possible that the opin-
ion in Tucker limits its restrictions on due-on-sale clauses to convey-
ances in which the trustor-obligor does not pass title to the third party
buyer. Nonetheless, subsequent discussion will indicate that there is
no substantial reason why the Tucker case should be so narrowly
construed.
Application of the Test in Tucker to Other
Transactions by the Trustor-Obligor
The court in Tucker considered only installment land sale con-
tracts.94 These types of contracts, however, are not commonly used,
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1661 (West 1973).
89. Schumacher v. Gaines, 18 Cal. App. 3d 994, 96 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1971).
90. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 580b (West Supp. 1975).
91. 68 Cal. 2d 93, 436 P.2d 65, 65 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1968). See also Karlsen v.
American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 15 Cal. App. 3d 112, 121, 92 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (1971);
Laurence v. Shutt, 269 Cal. App. 2d 749, 763-64, 75 Cal. Rptr. 533, 541-42 (1969).
92. Once again, it should be noted that legal title does not really pass, since actual
title to the property remains in the hands of the title insurance company. See note 2
supra.
93. Wong Ah Sure v. Ty Fook, 37 Cal. App. 465, 174 P. 64 (1918). See also
Kelly v. Smith, 218 Cal. 543, 24 P.2d 471 (1933); Ross v. McDougal, 12 Cal. App. 2d
172, 179, 55 P.2d 574, 578 (1936).
94. Moreover, the court concerned itself only with a trust deed and promissory
note, and not with a mortgage. Presumably, the holding of the Tucker case would apply
when a mortgage is used.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
November 1975] THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE IN' CALIFORNIA
since they have inherent limitations. One of the clearest disadvantages
for the buyer is that he has no guarantee that the trustor-obligor will
use the installment money to pay off the original loan; thus, the buyer
could be subject to foreclosure at any time. The real importance of
Tucker, then, depends upon the extent to which the holding may be
applied to other types of transactions. It will be seen that the balanc-
ing test announced in Tucker has potentially broad applicability.95
"Wrap-Around" Mortgage
One transaction to which the Tucker test should apply is the all-
inclusive or "wrap-around" mortgage. 96 This type of mortgage has re-
cently become popular as a tax tool in connection with real estate syn-
dications. 97  It also offers the buyer and seller certain non-tax advan-
tages, which are particularly desirable in the face of a tightening money
market.
98
The wrap-around mortgage has been defined as a purchase money
deed of trust99 which is subordinate to, yet includes the encumbrance
to which it is subordinated.' 0 The following illustration suggests how
the mortgage might work in connection with a due-on-sale clause:
Suppose the trustor-obligor (T-O) purchases property worth
$11,000. T-O makes a $4,000 down payment and takes a $7,000
loan from the lender (L), payable at 7.5 percent interest. The promis-
sory note and deed of trust which T-O signs contain due-on-sale provi-
sions. Note that, thus far, the illustration roughly approximates the sit-
uation in Tucker.
95. Much of the thinking behind the following sections is based on an excellent set
of hypothetical situations developed by Professor Jack F. Bonanno, of the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Bonanno
for his generosity in sharing these materials, as well as his kindness in discussing his
views on the Tucker case. However, the author assumes full responsibility for any errors
contained in the ensuing presentation.
96. See generally, Grebow, The Present and Future of the All-Inclusive Deed of
Trust, 6 J. BEvERLY HILLS B. ASS'N 17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Grebow]; Gunning
and Roegge, Contemporary Real Estate Financing Techniques: A Dialogue on Vanishing
Simplicity, 3 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 325 (1968); Healey, A "New" Security
Instrument, 41 CAL. ST. B.J. 681 (1961); Note, Wrap-Around Financing: A Technique
for Skirting the Usury Laws, 1972 DuKE L.J 785.
97. See Barnett, Use of the Wrap-Around Mortgage in Realty Sales: The Tax
Advantages and Problems, 40 J. TAXATON 274 (1974).
98. Grebow, supra note 96, at 18-19. In Grossman v. Sirianni, Civil No. 38138
(Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., filed Jan. 27, 1972), the court held that the transactions
involving a "wrap-around" mortgage were not usurious.
99. A purchase money trust deed is a generic term for a trust deed issued by the
borrower who is obtaining credit for the purpose of purchasing real estate. PUGH &
HrPPAx, supra note 63, at 184.
100. Grebow, supra note 96, at 17.
T-O finds a third party (B) who would like to purchase the prop-
erty for $12,000. T-0 and B decide to execute a "wrap-around" mort-
gage. B makes a $1,000 down payment to T-O. Then B gives T-
0 a second deed of trust, in which B promises to pay the remaining
$11,000 in monthly installments, with 8.5 percent interest on the un-
paid balance. B takes possession of the property, but T-0 retains title
and continues to make payments on his $7,000 loan from L.
This arrangement pleases both T-0 and B. T-0 still has title to
the property and retains the original financing from L.' Moreover,
T-0 can obtain a higher effective interest rate than if he had taken
back a conventional second trust deed.
If T-0 had used a conventional second trust deed, B would have
assumed T-O's $7,000 loan from L, and he would have borrowed the
remaining $4,000 from T-O at 8.5 percent interest, the same interest
rate as in the previous illustration involving the "wrap-around" mort-
gage. During the first year, then, T-O would receive interest amount-
ing to $34(8.5 percent of $4,000).
Under the "wrap-around" mortgage, however, T-0 receives $41
during his first year. This figure is obtained by taking the amount of
interest T-0 receives from B (8.5 percent of $11,000, or $93.50), and
subtracting the amount of interest T-0 owes L on the original loan (7.5
percent of $7,000, or $52.50). In effect, under the "wrap-around"
plan, T-O receives 10.25 percent on the $4,000 loan during the first
year.10 2  As the years pass, T-O's effective interest rate will drop, but
until his $7,000 loan is completely paid, he will be earning more inter-
est than if he had used the conventional second trust deed.' 03 On the
other hand, B is happy because he is paying only 8.5 percent interest
on the outstanding debt, rather than the current market interest rate
(which may be considerably higher).
Everything seems fine until L discovers what has occurred.
Claiming that T-0 has sold the property, L exercises the due-on-sale
clause in the original deed of trust and demands that T-0 immediately
101. Id. at 18.
102. Considerations of usury are beyond the scope of this article. However, it
should be noted that if the California usury law applied, T-O would possibly be able to
exceed the 10% legal limit, (because he is technically charging only 8.5% interest). But
see, e.g., Martin v. Ajax Constr. Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 425, 269 P.2d 132 (1954) (as a
general rule courts will not permit an evasion of the usury law by subterfuge).
103. For example, suppose after the first year, B has paid off $1,000 of T-O's loan
from L. All other things being equal, T-O will receive an effective interest payment of
$40 [the amount of interest paid to T-O by B (8.5% of $10,000, or $85] minus the
amount of interest T-O owes L on the original loan (7.5% of $6,000, or $45)]. In
effect, T-O is now receiving only 10% on the $4,000 loan. If, after a second year, B has
paid off an additional $1,000 of T-O's loan from L (making a total of $2,000), T-O
will receive an effective interest payment of $39, or 9.75% interest rate.
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pay the rest of his obligation on the $7,000 loan. L sues, and the judge
decides to adjudicate the matter on the basis of the test proposed in
Tucker. How should he proceed?
To satisfy the first element of the test, L must demonstrate that
B has been committing waste on the property or is likely to default
on his payments to T-O. If this part of the test is satisfied, the court
will then look at T-O's interest in the property. If T-O has received
only a small down payment from B and a large balance remains due,
exercise of the due-on-sale clause should not be permitted, since T-
O still has sufficient incentive to complete his obligation to L. If, how-
ever, B has made a large down payment, or only a small balance re-
mains due, the court should be more willing to allow the clause to be
enforced.
L may argue that acceleration should be automatic in both cases,
since the "wrap-around" mortgage technique is a ruse to disguise the
transfer of property, and the courts should discourage such transfers.
Although this argument has a certain appeal, it should be rejected.
There is only one basis upon which the court should decide if accelera-
tion is proper: whether or not the risks to the lender's security interest
caused by the transfer outweight the harmful effects of the consequent
restraint on alienation. It is true that the lender may be harmed by
a disguised transfer to a third party who is a bad security risk, espe-
cially since it would be more difficult for the lender to make a proper
investigation of the new buyer. Nevertheless, this fact alone should
not justify the blanket enforcement of the due-on-sale clause, especially
when the lender is exercising the clause to increase its interest rates
rather than to protect its security."0 4
The Sale-Leaseback
Another type of security arrangement which is becoming increas-
ingly popular, especially among builders and developers, is the sale-
leaseback.' 0 5 Most simply stated, a sale-leaseback is a transaction in
which a prospective developer sells property to an investor and then
leases it back. 0 6 This arrangement is advantageous to the developer
104. It should also be observed that if T-O still has a sizeable balance tied up in the
"wrap-around" mortgage, over and above the lender's mortgage or deed of trust, then T-
0 (as seller) has a substantial interest in seeing that the buyer paid off the lender and
protected the security.
105. This device is not used extensively by savings and loan associations, owing to
statutory limitations on their ability to own land. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 6705 (West
1968 & Supp. 1975); Moewe, Sale and Leaseback Financing of Real Estate as Mort-
gages under California Law, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 555 (1973).
106. See generally Thomas, Leasebacks in Commercial and Family Transactions, 28
MoNT. L. Rav. 25 (1966).
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because it provides him with liquidity, as well as a high rate of financ-
ing in relation to the value of the property. 1° For the investor, the
sale-leaseback offers the flexibility of a leasing arrangement as well as
a rate of return that is slightly higher than that which is available on
mortgages.' 08
These various advantages may best be understood through an il-
lustration. Suppose T-O buys an unimproved lot for $11,000, pays
$4,000 down and takes a $7,000 loan from L, repayable at 7.5 percent
interest. Again, these terms very roughly approximate those of the
Tucker case. Now, assume that T-O is a developer who wishes to
build a house on the lot but does not want to take out a conventional
second trust deed on the land in order to finance his project. Instead,
le sells the lot to investor (B) for $11,000, and B in turn leases i"
back to T-O at $100 a month for a fixed term. 109
This arrangement, which strongly resembles a secured loan, has
advantages for both B and T-O. B obtains land worth $11,000. In
all probability, the land will appreciate in value as the years pass.
Moreover, B is receiving $1,200 a year in rent, or an effective return
of 10.9 percent on his $11,000 investment. If B in fact intended the
transaction to be a secured loan, he may have succeeded in skirting
the 10 percent interest ceiling imposed by the California usury law. 1 0
107. Note, The Expanding Definition of "Security": Sale-Leasebacks and Other
Commercial Leasing Arrangements, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1221. It should be observed that the
threat of usury is present here.
108. Id.
109. Admittedly, the hypothetical example concerning the sale-leaseback is oversim-
plified. In actual fact, the investor would probably pay the seller-lessee only an amount
equal to the fair market value of the property minus the principal amount still due to the
lender on the deed of trust. The investor would be very unlikely to pay the full market
value of the property to the seller-lessee in cash (in the example, $11,000) without
receiving some additional security from the seller. Otherwise, the seller could be tempted
to leave for parts unknown with the cash, thereby leaving the investor with a worthless
lease and property having a net worth less than the amount paid by the investor.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that this hypothetical sets forth, in most simplified form, the
basic problems raised when the Tucker test is applied to the sale-leaseback.
110. The courts may determine, however, that the sale-leaseback is merely a
subterfuge for a secured loan. In other words, the court may decide that the relationship
is really that between a mortgagor and mortgagee, with title to the property being
conveyed merely for security. In such event, the rent payments will be considered in-
terest payments for the use of the purchase price (here, $12,000) and consequently will
be subject to the California usury law. See Moewe, Sale and Leaseback Financing of
Real Estate and Mortgages under California Law, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 555, 560 (1973).
The California usury provision, found in the constitution, reads, in part: "No
person, association, copartnership or corporation shall by charging any fee, bonus,
commission, discount or other compensation receive from a borrower more than 10
percent per annum upon any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in
action." CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22. See geneally Glushon & Oaks, The California
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On the other hand, T-O is also happy. Although he has passed
title to B, 11' he still retains possession of the land, and he can therefore
continue with his development project."' Moreover, he has $11,000
(minus the monthly rental payments, and the continued payments on
the loan from L) which he can use to promote his enterprise. If he
so desires, he can invest part of this sum and thereby help to offset
the cost of his rent.
Consider, now, whether the Tucker test should apply if a due-on-
sale clause is involved in a sale-leaseback situation. Suppose, in the
above illustration, that T-0 has given L a trust deed, containing a due-
on-sale clause, as security for the $7,000 loan. T-0 then enters into
the above-described sale-leaseback arrangement with B. Should L be
permitted to accelerate?
Some preliminary problems must be considered before determin-
ing whether the Tucker test should apply by analogy. Above all,
there are important differences between an installment sale (to which
the Tucker test was applied) and a sale-leaseback. First, in the install-
ment sale contract, title remains in the trustor-obligor and possession
generally passes to the third party buyer. In the sale-leaseback, on
the other hand, title passes to the third party buyer and possession re-
mains with the trustor-obligor. Moreover, in a sale-leaseback, laws
concerning the landlord-tenant relationship come into play.
In spite of these differences, it is submitted that the Tucker test
should be applicable in the sale-leaseback situation. In the sale-lease-
back, as in the installment sale, the interests of the lender in protecting
his security may conflict with the interest of the trustor-obligor in being
able to alienate his property. Thus, a standard is needed by which
these conflicting interests may be balanced. The Tucker test would
appear to be appropriate for the purpose.
Assume, once again, that L attempts to accelerate after T-0 has
entered into a sale-leaseback with B, and the court seeks to apply the
test used in Tucker.
To satisfy the first element of the test, L will have to demonstrate
that B is committing waste, or that the sale-leaseback has enhanced the
risk of default. It will be difficult for L to show that B is engaging
in waste, since B is not in possession of the lot. Furthermore, if T-
Usury Law: The Lender's Trap and the Borrower's Windfall?, 43 CAL. ST. BJ. 56
(1968); Note, The Mortgage Banking Act: A New Way Around California's Usury
Laws?, 26 HAsTiNGs LJ. 460, 461-62, 472-75 (1974).
111. Actually, T-O has passed only equitable title to B, since the legal title remains
in the holder of the original trust deed. See note 2, supra.
112. B is now, of course, subject to applicable landlord-tenant law regarding "good
husbandry" and waste. See note 114, infra.
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O commits omissive or permissive waste, 1 ' he is liable not only to L,
but also to B. 11 4 Therefore, T-O has a strong incentive to practice
good husbandry in his treatment of the property.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the transfer will significantly enhance
a risk of default. If T-O has received only partial payment from B,
there may be a risk that B will default. Nevertheless, it may well be
that B is a better security risk than T-O. Furthermore, absent a nova-
tion or the applicability of anti-deficiency legislation," 5 both T-O and
B will now be liable to L. Thus, L will have even greater security
than before.
On the other hand, the second element in the Tucker test could
weigh heavily in L's favor. If T-O has made an outright sale to B,
automatic acceleration by L would result in a minimal quantum of re-
straint, since T-O would probably have sufficient funds to pay off the
first lien. If, however, T-0 has made an installment contract with B,
the reasoning developed earlier with respect to installment contracts
would apply: the quantum of restraint would vary according to the
amount of the down payment which T-O has received and the sum
which remains outstanding." 6
The Sale-Buyback
The sale-buyback involves the purchase of property by the inves-
tor at a mutually determined price, and immediate resale by the inves-
tor at the same price to the developer on a long-term installment con-
tract. "7 If a due-on-sale clause is involved, the transaction should be
treated similarly to a sale-leaseback. 1 8
113. Presumably, the developer would not be liable for meliorating waste. If the
property in question were a residential building, rather than an unimproved lot, T-O
(tenant) would have statutory remedies in California. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1942
(West 1954 & Supp. 1975).
114. "If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint tenant, or tenant in common of
real property, commit waste thereon, any person aggrieved by the waste may bring an
action against him therefor, in which action there may be judgment for treble damages."
CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 732 (West 1955). Note that waste is not defined by the statute,
but must be determined by common law standards. McCord v. Oakland Quicksilver
Mining Co., 64 Cal. 134, 27 P. 863 (1883).
115. See text accompanying notes 135-37 infra.
116. See text accompanying notes 40-59 supra.
117. Hershman, Usury and "New Look" in Real Estate Financing, 4 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TRUsT J. 315, 321 (1969).
118. Granted, distinctions exist between sale-leasebacks and sale-buybacks. Land-
lord-tenant laws apply only to the former type of transaction. Moreover, in a sale-
buyback, the trustor-obligor regains his equity in the property with each payment that he
makes to the third party buyer. Nevertheless, it is submitted that these distinctions do not
alter the basic thrust of the argument developed in the section dealing with sale-
leasebacks.
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"Front Money" Arrangements
In "front money" deals, the investor purchases land and then joins
with a developer to undertake a development project. The investor
and developer enter into a joint venture or partnership, or they form
a corporation in which the two share the stock.119 Usually the investor
is assured priority in using the profits from the enterprise to return the
original investment. After the return of capital has been achieved, he
shares in the profits according to a formula established in the agree-
ment.
1 2 0
The advantage of the "front money" arrangement is that the in-
vestor and builder can pool their skills in a common endeavor. More-
over, if the enterprise is successful, the investor will receive a large
return. 21  On the other hand, it should be noted that certain risks are
involved as well. The investor may incur liabilities by becoming a
member of the enterprise. It is also possible that the enterprise will
not be sufficiently profitable to return his capital and generate an ade-
quate yield on the investment.
22-°
Now, suppose the investor purchases the land with a loan contain-
ing a due-on-sale clause. He then joins with a developer in a "front
money" arrangement. It is submitted that the lender should not be
able to accelerate automatically. In the first place, the investor is
merely sharing his title and possession of the property with a third
party; he is not making an outright transfer. In this respect, "front
money" deals differ from the other security transactions thus far con-
sidered. In the second place, when the investor enters into the "front
money" arrangement, he remains primarily liable to the original lender,
absent a novation. 23 Thus, the lender should be required to show a
119. For discussion of the relative advantages of the joint venture (general partner-
ship) and the limited partnership, as far as developer and investor are concerned, see
Fink, Joint Ventures, Limited Partnerships, Sale-Leaseback and Other Devices: The
Developer's Approach-Part 1, 52 Cm. B. REc. 323 (1971).
120. PUGH & Hn'PAKA, supra note 63, at 219.
121. That is, larger than if the lender had kept his money within the conventional
lending market.
122. PUGH & HIPPAKA, supra note 63, at 219.
123. If the investor forms a corporation with the developer, the investor will remain
personally liable on the note, since it would constitute a pre-incorporation contract. Even
if the corporation subsequently "adopted" the investor's obligation, he would still remain
individually liable. See N. LATrN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS 111 (2d ed. 1971). For
discussion of California law relating to the liability of promoters, see MacDonald v.
Arrowhead Hot Springs Co., 114 Cal. App. 496, 300 P. 105 (1931).
If the investor forms a joint venture or partnership with the developer, the investor
also remains personally liable on the note. In the case of Bank of America Nat. Trust &
Say. Assn. v. Kumle, 70 Cal. App. 2d 362, 160 P.2d 875 (1945) the court held that
when a person borrows money from a bank and later joins a partnership, the partner-
ship is not liable on the loan.
security risk before exercising its powers under the due-on-sale clause.'
2 4
Outright Sale by Trustor-Obligor
In La Sala, the court held that a lender should have an automatic
right to accelerate if the trustor-obligor makes an outright sale of the
encumbered property to a third party. -125  This part of the decision was
dictum, and future courts may wish to reconsider this view in light of
the reasoning developed in Tucker. There are three types of outright
sales to which a court might apply the Tucker test.
Trustor-Obligor Receives Back a Note and Second Deed
of Trust from Purchaser
In the first type of sale, the trustor-obligor conveys legal title and
possession to the buyer and receives back a promissory note and second
deed of trust as part of the consideration. Here, the court should use
the same criteria in judging the transaction as it would in the case of
an installment contract. If the trustor-obligor has received a small cash
payment, and a large balance remains due on the second deed of trust,
the lender should have a strong burden of showing that the transfer
enhances the risk of waste or default. If, on the other hand, the trus-
tor-obligor has received a large cash payment, or only a small balance
is left outstanding, the court should be more willing to permit accelera-
tion.
Trustor-Obligor Receives Full Payment, and his Original Deed of Trust
is not Subject to Anti-Deficiency Legislation
In the second type of sale, the trustor-obligor conveys legal title
and possession to the buyer and receives full payment for his equity
in cash or other property. 1 26  Moreover, the trustor-obligor's original
deed of t:-ust is not subject to anti-deficiency legislation; consequently,
when titc passes to the third party buyer, the trustor-obligor remains
fully liable on the first obligation.
127
Whether or not a lender should automatically be able to accelerate
in this situation depends on the extent to which the court still accepts
the reasoning advanced in the Cherry case. In Cherry it was held that
124. Professor Iletland suggests that a due-on-sale clause should not be auto-
matically exercisable when there is an assignment from one co-owner to another, trans-
fer from the trustor-obligor to his wholly-owned corporation, or sale of corporate stock
by the corporate trustor-obligor. J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 191 (1970).
125. See text accompanying notes 27-37 supra.
126. In other words, the trustor-vendor receives no promissory note or deed of trust
from the third party buyer.
127. See text accompanying notes 135-39 infra.
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a lender's desire to maintain its portfolio at current interest rates justi-
fied the exercise of a due-on-sale clause. 2 ' This argument was sub-
sequently rejected in La Sala as being inapplicable when the trustor-
obligor merely encumbered his property with a junior lien.129  The
argument was also rejected in Tucker, in so far as it might apply to
installment sale contracts. 30 Nonetheless, the court in Tucker spe-
cifically refrained from considering the validity of the Cherry argu-
ment in a situation in which the trustor-obligor makes an outright sale
to a third party.'"'
If the court applies the reasoning in Cherry to outright sales, then
the lender should have little difficulty justifying automatic acceleration.
The quantum of restraint imposed on the trustor-obligor would be
minimal, since he could pay off his original obligation with the money
he receives from the third party buyer.
It is submitted, however, that the Cherry argument should be re-
jected entirely. The clear thrust of the Tucker decision is that a "due-
on" clause is valid only to protect the lender's security. A lender may
resort to other devices to keep interest rates at current market levels
which do not so severely impair a trustor-obligor's freedom of aliena-
tion.13 2  Thus, in order to exercise a due-on-sale clause, the lender
128. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 27-37 supra.
130. 12 Cal. 3d at 639 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175-76, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40.
131. Id. at 634-35 n.7, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
132. Professor Bonnano has proposed three possible devices: variable interest rates,
short term loans with an option to renew, and a true long-term loan. Note that the true
long term loan contemplates a lock-in clause to prevent prepayment. See Bonanno, supra
note 11, at 303-07. See also Comment, The Variable Interest Note: An Answer to
Uncertainty in a Fluctuating Money Market, 1971 L. & Soc. ORDER 600; Comment, The
Variable Interest Rate Clause and Its Use in California Real Estate Transactions, 19
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 468 (1972). In an amicus brief for defendant Lassen Savings and Loan,
arguments were presented in opposition to Professor Bonanno's suggested alternatives to
the "due-on" clause. The arguments were (1) the "due-on" clause leaves a portion of
the risk of upward fluctuation on the lender, whereas the three proposals would shift the
risk to the borrower; (2) the cost of administering the three proposed alternatives would
be substantial, owing to the additional clerical work involved; and (3) Professor
Bonanno's proposals would introduce a high level of uncertainty into real estate financ-
ing. Brief for California Savings & Loan League as Amicus Curiae at 35-37, Tucker v.
Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
These arguments are specious. First, the risk of upward fluctuation rests solidly on
the trustor-obligor who is subject to automatic acceleration under a "due-on" clause. If
interest rates go up, the lender can threaten to enforce the clause should the trustor-
obligor transfer the property, even if the transferee is an excellent security risk.
Consequently, there is a serious restraint on the trustor-obligor's ability to alienate, and
the lender often is able to exact higher rates of interest from the trustor-obligor or the
new buyer. On the other hand, if interest rates go down, the trustor-obligor receives no
benefit at all. He must continue to pay the lender the previously high rate. It is difficult
to imagine that Pr6fessor Bonanno's proposed alternatives could involve any greater risk
to the borrower.
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should have the burden of showing that a sale by the trustor-obligor
Secondly, there is no reason to suppose that the administration of variable interest
rates would be costly. Other countries have had successful experiences with them.
Moreover, as Professor Bonanno notes, many savings and loan associations in California
have successfully dealt with the annual variations that are introduced into monthly
mortgage payments, which include an amount to be held as an impound for the payment
of property taxes. Nevertheless, the institutional lenders have not complained about the
administrative costs of making these changes. Brief for Jack F. Bonanno as Amicus
Curiae at 17, Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
Finally, it is unlikely that the alternatives proposed by Professor Bonanno would
introduce a high level of uncertainty into real estate financing. Under a due-on-sale
clause the trustor-obligor who wishes to transfer his property is already subject to great
uncertainty in that the lender may exercise the clause and demand full immediate
payment as well as a prepayment fee. This uncertainty would not arise under the sug-
gested alternatives. From the lender's point of view, variable interest rates would permit
savings and loan associations to make long term loans without risking a poor investment
return, since they would be assured of not being locked into lower interest rates in times
of inflation. Comment, The Variable Interest Rate Clause and Its Use in California
Real Estate Transactions, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 468, 482 (1972). Thus, the variable in-
terest rate would reduce rather than increase the uncertainty for the lender.
The variable interest rate has been used successfully in other countries. In 1966,
Canada's Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation was authorized to reset the
maximum interest rate quarterly, at 1 % above the yield on the long term Government
of Canada bonds, adjusted to the nearest 14%. 13 CONSTRUCTION REVIEW, August, 1967
at 10. The variable interest rate was used in Chile, prior to the 1973 coup. Martin, The
Chile Savings and Loan System, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (1968). Lndex bonds (government bonds
linked to a predetermined index) have been tried or considered in France, Switzerland,
Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Japan, Israel, Sweden and Luxemburg. Robinson, Readjusti-
ble Mortgages in an Inflationary Economy-A Study of the Israeli Experience, 5 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 169, 170 (1971). See generally, Lefcoe, Monetary Correction and
Mortgage Lending in Brazil: Observations for the United States, 21 STAN. L. REv.
106 (1968).
In 1971, legislation was enacted in California to permit the use of variable interest
rates. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1975). The index to be used is the average
cost of savings, borrowings, and Federal Home Loan Bank advances to members of the
FHLB of San Francisco. Increases or decreases in the interest rate may not exceed 4
of 1% in any semi-annual period. Adequate notice must be given to borrowers before
the rates can be changed. Moreover, if the savings and loan association intends to
increase the rate, the borrower has a right to prepay the loan, without a prepayment
charge.
The Federal Home Loan Bank has also established rules to facilitate the variable
interest rate. These rules are not yet in effect. They provide that (1) changes in the
interest rate would follow an index beyond the control of the lender; (2) increases could
come no more often than once every six months, and could not exceed 1/2 of 1% at any
time, with a 21/2% absolute ceiling on upward movement; (3) increases in the index
could permit increases in the mortgage rate at the lender's option, but decreases in the
index would have to be passed on to the homeowner; (4) 45 days notice would have to
be given before any change in the rates; (5) the borrower could prepay the loan at any
time without penalty; and (6) complete disclosure, including the potential maximum cost
of the loan, would have to be made at the outset. The Evening Star, Aug. 11, 1974
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enhances the risk of waste or default.
133
This burden should be difficult to establish when the original deed
of trust is not subject to anti-deficiency legislation and the trustor-obli-
gor still owes a substantial sum on the obligation. Since the trustor-
obligor in this situation remains liable to the lender, he has an impor-
tant incentive not to default. For the same reason, he has an interest
in making certain that the third party buyer keeps the property free
from waste. 3 " Conversely, the burden should be less difficult to es-
tablish when the trustor-obligor owes only a small amount on the first
lien, since he would have less incentive to prevent a default.
The Original Deed of Trust is Subject to Anti-Deficiency Legislation
The due-on-sale clause should be treated differently if the original
deed of trust is subject to anti-deficiency legislation under section 580b
of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 35 This section provides
at 11. Moreover, in February, 1974, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board took a step
toward encouraging greater flexibility in mortgage financing by authorizing Federal
Savings and Loan Associations to provide for flexible mortgage payments. PEDERAL
HOME LOAN BANK BOARD ANNUAL MANUAL OF STATuTEs AND REGULATIONS 728, §
541.14(c) (1975); 12 C.F.R. § 541.14(c) (1975). See generally Cassidy & McElhone,
The Flexible Payment Mortgage, 7 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BoARD J., Aug., 1974, at 7.
Other solutions have been proposed to help savings and loan associations deal with
the present tight money conditions. For example, contingent interest features could
provide a lender with the possibility of additional income beyond the contract mortgage
rate, subject to the earnings performance of the property calculated as a percentage of
gross income, net income (after expenses, debt services and taxes), or some other
measure defined in the loan agreement. Wright, Innovations in Mortgage Finance, 25 J.
AM. Soc'Y OF CHARTERED LiFE UNDERwRrrERS Jan., 1971, at 29, 33.
For further discussion of the variable interest rate, see generally Poole, Opper &
Tayloy, The Variable-Rate Mortgage on Single-Family Homes, FEDERAL RESERVE STAFF
STUDY: WAYS TO MODERATE FLUCTUATIONS IN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 377, (1972);
McManus, Variable Mortgage Note: Route to Increased Housing, 55 A.B.A.J. 557
(1969); Plant, Variable Rate Morgages: Their Advantages for Lenders, Borrowers, and
the Shelter Industry, FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J., Sept., 1974, at 11. The new
"anti-recession" tax law, signed by President Ford, includes a tax credit of 5% of the
cost of a new home purchase, up to a maximum of $2,000. Credit is limited to purchases
between March 13 and December 31, 1975, and to homes never before occupied that
were built or under construction as of March 25, 1975. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1975, at
30, col. 5.
133. Nevertheless, some would argue that the trustor-obligor who received full
payment for his equity could evade the obligation by leaving the country or going into
bankruptcy, whereas the trustor-obligor who was to receive piecemeal payment for his
equity and retain an interest in the property to assure such payment would not leave the
country or go into bankruptcy, since the piecemeal payments would then be lost.
134. See note 114 supra.
135. "No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property
for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or
mortgage, given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of
real property, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a dwelling for not more than
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that if a creditor receives a purchase money security, under no circum-
stances may he recover a personal judgment against the buyer after a
foreclosure. Rather, he must look to the security for recovery of the
obligation. 1 6
In 1963, limitations were placed on the definition of a "purchase
money" security. The law now provides that a third party loan is sub-
ject to section 580b only if (1) it is used to pay all or part of the pur-
chase price of the property; (2) it is secured by the property pur-
chased; (3) the property purchased is to be used as a dwelling by not
more than four families; and (4) the dwelling, or some part of it, is
occupied by the purchaser. 13  Any third party loan which is secured
by commercial or unimproved property is not a "purchase money" loan
under section 5 80b.
3 8
Consider the effect of this anti-deficiency legislation on the exer-
cise of a due-on-sale clause. Trustor-obligor (T-O) has executed a
"purchase money" deed of trust in favor of lender (L). The deed
of trust contains a due-on-sale clause. T-O sells the encumbered prop-
erty to a third party buyer (B), and L decides to accelerate. " ' How
should a court apply the Tucker test in this situation?
Even assuming that a due-on-sale clause is valid only to protect
the lender's security, L should be able to accelerate automatically, since
T-O has no incentive to prevent waste or default. According to section
580b, L's only remedy against T-O in case of default is to retake the
encumbered property; since T-O no longer owns the property, L can
get nothing from him. As a result, it would be fair to permit L to
exercise the due-on-sale clause and call the loan immediately due.
four families given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan which was in fact used to
pay all or part of the purchase price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the
purchaser." CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 580b (West Supp. 1975). See also Hetland,
Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New Judicial Approach, 51 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1963); Riesenfeld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 705 (1960); Rintala, California's Anti-Deficiency Legislation and
Suretyship Law: The Transversion of Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
245 (1969).
136. Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953). See also 1 MILLER &
STARR, supra note 2, at 545.
137. See also id. at 542.
138. Thus, the loan in the Tucker case did not fall within the ambit of section
580b, since the Tuckers did not intend to use the property as their dwelling. See Brief
for Jack F. Bonnano as Amicus Curiae at 9, Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal.
3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
139. In this hypothetical example, it is assumed that T-O is given full payment in
cash or property for his equity in the property.
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Separately Secured Notes
The situation would become more complex should the trustor-
obligor decide to execute separately-secured promissory notes.
140
Suppose T-0 buys Blackacre for $100,000. He pays $20,000 in cash
and assumes a $50,000 trust deed on the property. To complete the
balance of the purchase price, T-O gives L two promissory notes, one
for $20,000 and the other for $10,000. The $20,000 note is secured
by Blackacre, and the $1,000 note is secured by Whiteacre, another
parcel of property which T-O owns.
The above facts roughly approximate the situation in Roseleaf
Corp. v. Chierighino,141 a leading case concerning California anti-de-
ficiency legislation. It should be observed that the $10,000 note does
not fall within section 580b, since it is secured by property other than
that which is being purchased. 142  In Roseleaf, the court held that the
beneficiary (L, in our hypothetical) could foreclose the two promissory
notes independently. 43  In other words, after calling the $20,000 pur-
chase money note due, L could recover a deficiency judgment on the
$10,000 non-purchase-money note to the extent that L's security
(Blackacre) was inadequate to satisfy the original judgment.
140. See 1 MILLER & STARR, supra note 2, at 548-49.
141. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 21 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963). The fact situation is
based on that found in 1 MiLLFR & STARR, supra note 2, at 548. Note that other
situations may complicate the "anti-deficiency" considerations. For example, section
580b may be waived under some circumstances. In Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603,
498 P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972), defendants bought some property for $90,000.
They paid $26,100 in cash and gave a promissory note for $63,900 secured by a purchase
money deed of trust, which was to be subordinated to constructions notes for up to $2
million. Defendants waived their protection from anti-deficiency judgments and gave a
written personal guarantee of joint and several liability for the payment of the $63,900
note. Upon default, the court held that defendants' waiver of section 580b was valid;
therefore, plaintiff was permitted to seek a deficiency judgment. The court ruled that
section 580b applies to sold out junior lienors holding a purchase money trust deed.
This ruling, however, applies automatically only to the standard purchase money
situation. If the transaction in question is a variation on the standard purchase money
mortgage or trust deed, it should be examined so as to determine whether it subserves the
purposes of section 580b. Id. at 611, 498 P.2d at 1059, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
In addition, only a part of a piece of property may be secured by a "purchase
money" loan. In Prunty v. Bank of America, 37 Cal. App. 3d 430, 112 Cal. Rptr. 370
(1974), plaintiffs bought some unimproved real estate with their own funds. They then
obtained a construction loan to erect a residence on the property. The residence was built
with the proceeds of the loan, but was later destroyed by a natural disaster. The court
held that section 580b banned the bank from recovering a deficiency judgment in the
event of plaintiff's default and judicial foreclosure and sale under the deed of trust. The
court noted that although the construction loan was not made to effect the purchase of
land, the protections of section 580b still applied.
142. See note 135 supra.
143. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 41, 378 P.2d 97, 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876 (1963).
Now suppose that the $20,000 purchase money note contains a
due-on-sale clause, and T-O sells Blackacre to B. Should L be per-
mitted to accelerate automatically on the $20,000 note? If one applies
the Tucker test, there should be no acceleration unless L can show a
risk of waste or default. T-O still has an incentive to prevent default,
even after he transfers Blackacre to B, because he is liable on the $10,-
000 note. If the non-purchase-money note has been for more than
$10,000 (for example, $20,000), T-O would have even greater incen-
tive to prevent default, and the court should be even more reluctant
to allow automatic acceleration.
Additional Security
The situation would also become more complicated if the lender
took both a chattel mortgage and a trust deed to secure the same obli-
gation from the trustor-obligor. The law provides that if the trustor-
obligor defaults, the lender can foreclose the lien on the chattel either
before or after he has foreclosed the trust deed.'14  This rule is valid
whether or not anti-deficiency legislation would otherwise be appli-
cable.
Assume that T-O has given L a purchase money deed of trust,
as well as a chattel mortgage, to secure the loan that he has received
to pay for Blackacre. T-O then sells Blackacre to B. Although T-
O is no longer liable on this deed of trust, he remains liable on the
chattel mortgage. Hence, he still has some incentive to prevent default
by B. As a result, L should not be able to accelerate automatically
when T-O transfers the property.
Effect of the Tucker Decision on National Banking
Associations Located in California
National banking associations are empowered by federal law to
make real estate loans secured by first liens145 upon improved real es-
tate.' 46 Federal Savings and Loan Associations, chartered by the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, may also make such loans, provided the
secured real estate lies within one hundred miles of the home office.' 47
144. 1 MILLER & STARR, supra note 2, at 546.
145. "A first lien on real estate within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 371 is any lien
which grants to the holder thereof a claim against the property so secured which is prior
to the rights of all others with respect thereto. Such a lien will normally be created by an
instrument in the form of a mortgage or deed of trust but may also consist of a judgment
which by operation of law creates a lien against certain property of the judgment debtor
or a land contract. ... 12 C.F.R. § 7.2040(b) (1975).
146. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
147. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970).
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Since national banking associations often foreclose in federal courts, the
question may arise as to the effect of the Tucker decision on such pro-
ceedings.
A federal court which conducts such a foreclosure proceeding
would not necessarily be bound by state substantive law, since the Erie
doctrine14 applies only to cases in federal court because of diversity
of citizenship. 14 9 Nonetheless, there is still some basis for arguing that
Tucker may have some impact. Consider, for example, the following
excerpt from a regulation issued by the Comptroller of Currency, re-
garding real estate loans secured by leaseholds:150
(2) In order to qualify as an acceptable leasehold for security
for a real estate loan made by a national bank, the covenants and
restrictions contained in the lease which provide for forfeiture or
reversion in the event of a breach must not be more onerous or bur-
densome than those contained in leases in general use in the area
in which such bank is located .... 151
Could one extend this statute, by analogy, to the situation in which a
piece of real estate is secured by a trust deed containing a due-on-sale
clause? If so, it would seem that exercise of the due-on-sale clause
by a federal banking association should be governed by the same stand-
ards as those applicable to California chartered lenders.
Further Challenges to the "Due-on" Clause
After Tucker v. Lassen
As has been demonstrated, the test proposed in Tucker may be
applied to a wide variety of situations in which the trustor-obligor con-
veys title or possession to a third party. Moreover, the test is a fair
one: it balances the legitimate interests that the lender has in avoiding
waste and default on the encumbered property against the legitimate
right of the trustor-obligor to transfer his property.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the "due-on" clause will be chal-
lenged further. Three likely grounds for objection to the "due-on'
clause are that (1) its exercise constitutes an unlawful taking of prop-
erty, absent a preliminary hearing; (2) it constitutes a penalty and
148. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
149. Nevertheless, since restraints on alienation affect transferability, the substan-
tive law on transferability of the situs should apply. Therefore, Tucker would be
important in all federal cases, not merely those in which there is diversity of
citizenship.
150. National banking associations are permitted to make real estate loans secured
by first liens upon improved real estate, on a leasehold under a lease which does not
expire for at least 10 years beyond the maturity date of the loan. 12 U.S.C. § 374
(1970).
151. 12 C.F.R. § 7.2200(b)(2) (1975).
is therefore in violation of the California Civil Code; and (3) it is void
as an adhesion contract. Given the present state of California law, it
is unlikely that any of these three arguments will be successful in the
near future. 15 2 Nevertheless, each of them merits discussion.
Requirement of a Hearing
In the landmark decision of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,153
the United States Supreme Court declared that prejudgment garnish-
ment of wages is unconstitutional unless the debtor is first afforded
the opportunity of a preliminary hearing to determine the validity of
the creditor's action. The Sniadach principle has subsequently been
extended to govern a wide variety of prejudgment remedies.1" The
argument has therefore been made that the "due-on" clause is a pre-
judgment remedy which should also be governed by this principle. 55
The Sniadach holding was based on the fourteenth amendment
provision that a state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law. Exercise of a "due-on" clause does
not necesarily involve the loss of property. If the trustor-obligor can
pay the loan when it is called due, he retains ownership and posses-
152. One other argument that the author has chosen not to discuss in the main text
is that the "due-on" clause is potentially a tool which a lender can use to practice racial
discrimination. This possibility is suggested by the facts in Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972). In Pulaski, plaintiff (a White
resident) purchased some property in Little Rock. More Blacks gradually moved into the
neighborhood. Because of increasingly difficult trouble in finding renters, plaintiff
endeavored to sell his property to a Black couple. Pulaski (from whom the plaintiff had
obtained a mortgage on the property) refused to approve the transfer and attempted to
accelerate the outstanding debt. The court in this case decided that acceleration was
improper, and held that a due-on-sale clause can be enforced only where the lender
shows a security risk. It is conceivable, however, that a lender could use the threat of
acceleration under a "due-on" clause as a means of pressuring White trustor-obligors not
to transfer to Blacks.
153. 396 U.S. 337 (1969).
154. E.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (repossession and
distribution of collateral by a secured party after default by debtor, under California
Commercial Code sections 9503 and 9504); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (assertion of a baggage lien by an innkeeper); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d
903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970) (prejudgment garnishment of wages, even
though the state statute exempted one-half of the party's wages); Mihans v. Municipal
Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970) (issuance of a prejudgment writ of
immediate possession pending hearing on the merits in an unlawful detainer action). But
see Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973) (postjudgment
garnishment of wages not forbidden); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 29 Cal. App. 3d
681, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1972) (issuance of a temporary restraining order not forbid-
den); Western Bd. of Adjustors, Inc. v. Covina Publishing, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d 659, 88
Cal. Rptr. 293 (1970) (contracts such as sales of merchandise not covered by Sniadach).
155. Brief of Jack F. Bonanno as Amicus Curiae at 11, Tucker v. Lassen Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
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sion. 156 On the other hand, he loses certain property rights, among
them the benefit of a long-term loan, which would permit him to spread
the purchase price of the property over as long as twenty or thirty years.
Even more seriously, if he cannot meet the lender's demand for ac-
celeration, he risks foreclosure.
These property rights are of the type afforded protection by the
Constitution. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 5 7 the Supreme Court held that
a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a "depri-
vation" in terms of the fourteenth amendment. The court added that
the amendment's protection of property has never been interpreted as
applying merely to the right of undisputed ownership; rather, it has
been read broadly to extend protection to "any significant property in-
terests.' 58  Although Fuentes involved the constitutionality of a state
law authorizing the summary seizure of goods under a writ of replevin,
the broad interpretation which the court gave to the applicability of the
fourteenth amendment should apply to a trustor-obligor's property
rights, as well.
Moreover, the lender could not contend that when the trustor-ob-
ligor signed the trust deed containing the "due-on" clause, he waived
his due process protection. In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,"5 the
Supreme Court ruled that one can contractually waive his due process
protections, provided the waiver is made "voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly."' 60  In Overmyer, a contract was negotiated between two
corporations, and the waiver provision in question was specifically bar-
gained for and drafted by the lawyers in the process of the negotia-
tions.' 10 Therefore, the waiver was upheld.
The Court in Fuentes distinguished the situation in Overmyer. In
Fuentes, the contract which appellant signed provided that if she de-
faulted on any payment, the seller could retake the merchandise.
62
' 156. Technically, the trustee retains ownership for the duration of the trust deed.
Thus, when the trustor-obligor pays off the debt after the lender has accelerated, he
obtains clear title to the property. See note 2 supra.
157. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The holding in Fuentes was limited in Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Nevertheless, in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem., Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Supreme Court held that Fuentes was not
overruled.
158. 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972), quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379
(1971).
159. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
160. Id. at 187.
161. Id.
162. In Fuentes, plaintiff purchased a gas stove and a stereo from Firestone Tire
and Rubber Company. The total cost of the stove and stereo was about $500, plus an
additional financing charge of over $100. Under the contracts, Firestone retained title to
the merchandise, but plaintiff was entitled to possession until she defaulted on her
installment payments.
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The Court ruled that the appellant had not waived her fourteenth
amendment rights, since the waiver provision, which was a necessary
condition of the sale, was a printed part of a form sales contract. Fur-
thermore, the parties, unlike those in Overmyer, had unequal bargain-
ing power.
163
A "due-on" provision is part of a standard form deed of trust.
The trustor-obligor can never bargain for its exclusion."" Conse-
quently, a trustor-obligor should not be deemed to have waived his con-
stitutional protections merely because he signs the document.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a trustor-obligor would be af-
forded a mandatory preliminary hearing prior to a lender's exercise of
a "due-on" clause, since the fourteenth amendment applies only to
state action.' 65 Consequently, the California courts have invoked
Sniadach only in cases in which state action could be proved.
The involvement of state personnel is normally a prerequisite to
a finding of state action. In Kipp v. Cozens,166 the court recognized
that there are certain exceptions to this rule, but noted that the excep-
tions have generally been recognized only when a state official was act-
ing in concert with a private individual, when state law compelled the
action, when the power exercised was purely of statutory as distin-
guished from common law or contractual origin, or when private con-
duct has become entwined with governmental action.' 6 7
The only exception which could conceivably apply to the "due-
on" clause is the last one. The trustor-obligor might argue that the
lending industry is so highly regulated and performs so important a
function that the act of the lender should be treated as the act of the
state itself. This argument, however, was specifically rejected by the
state supreme court in Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank.'68  In Kruger, a
depositor sued to stop the bank from applying the balance of her check-
ing account to a delinquency in her charge account. Although the
court noted that banking corporations owe their existence to state law,
derive their right to practice banking from a government license, are
For more than a year, plaintiff made her installment payments; however, with about
only $200 remaining to be paid, a dispute developed between her and Firestone over the
servicing of the stove. Firestone sued in small claims court for repossession of both the
stove and the stereo. At the same time, Firestone obtained a writ of replevin ordering a
sheriff to seize the disputed goods. 407 U.S. at 70.
163. Id. at 95.
164. See text accompanying notes 186-203 infra.
165. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11
Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) the court held that article 1,
section 13 of the California Constitution also imposes a requirement of state action.
166. 40 Cal. App. 3d 709, 115 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1974).
167. Id. at 714-15, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
168. 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974).
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subject to extensive state and national regulations, fulfill important
functions often performed by government agencies, and exert great in-
fluence upon the economic health of the nation,169 the justices nonethe-
less ruled that the bank's set-off of the depositor's charge account debt
constituted private rather than state action. The court added:
As concepts of state action evolve to correspond more closely
to economic reality, we may arrive at judicial recognition that such
institutions and enterprises should be considered agents of the state,
so that those who deal with them will receive the protection not
only of decisional law but of constitutional due process .... A de-
cision at this time subjecting banks and other public service enter-
prises to the requirements of constitutional due process would be
unwarranted in light of present authority. 70
The "Due-on" Clause as a Liquidated Damages Provision
In several states, courts have treated the due-on-sale clause as liq-
uidated damages. 17 ' Lenders attempting to exercise such a clause
must generally prove impairment of security before being granted a
right of acceleration.'7 2  In effect, the lenders in these states are sub-
ject to the same standard as the one proposed by the Tucker test, since
the due-on-sale clause is considered valid only in so far as it protects
the lender's security interest. In California, this result has been
achieved through the restraints on alienation doctrine rather than
through the application of principles relating to liquidated damages.
Thus, California courts have apparently had no need to consider
whether or not "due-on" clauses constitute liquidated damages.
Classically, the judiciary in California has been among the quick-
est to invalidate liquidated damages provisions. In light of this severe
attitude, it is arguable that the state courts could be convinced to use
liquidated damages principles to invalidate the due-on-sale clause com-
pletely, even in situations in which the lender can prove impairment
of security. It is submitted, however, that these courts would not do
so, at least at the present time.
Generally, California law provides that clauses providing for liq-
uidated damages upon breach of a contract are void, unless it would
be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage.17 1 With
169. Id. at 364-65, 521 P.2d at 448, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
170. Id. at 365, 521 P.2d at 449, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
171. E.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971);
Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 1970).
172. See Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to
Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. PEv. 747 (1973).
173. California Civil Code section 1670 provides: "Every contract by which the
amount of damage to be paid, or other compensation to be made, for a breach of an
obligation, is determined in anticipation thereof, is to that extent void, except as
expressly provided in the next section."
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respect to land contracts in particular, the court in Drew v. Pedlar174
suggested that a liquidated damages clause may never be proper, since
section 3307 of the California Civil Code specifies the damages recov-
erable in such contracts.
17 '5
In this light, acceleration provisions in land contracts would appear
especially vulnerable to invalidation. Nonetheless, the California
courts have not always reached this conclusion; they have refused to
enforce acceleration provisions in leases, but have sustained those
found in promissory notes.17  In Ricker v. Rombaugh,' 77 for example,
the court voided a lease provision which permitted the landlord to ac-
celerate all of the rent payments should the tenant default at anytime
or violate any term in the lease. In Ricker, Judge Hoyt explained why
he would treat an acceleration clause in a promissory note differently:
In leases the tenant pays rent for the possession and use of the
property leased. In promissory notes the borrower pays interest
for the possession and use of the money loaned. For an accelera-
tion clause in a note to be similar to a rent acceleration clause in a
lease it would have to provide that upon default all of the interest
agreed to be paid should become immediately due and payable.
Note acceleration clauses provide for acceleration of the payment
of the principal sum loaned not for acceleration of interest. 7 8
If the court's distinction between a valid charge for the use of
money and a penalty for the failure to pay is sound,1 79 one must con-
clude that a due-on-sale clause in a promissory note or deed of trust
does not constitute liquidated damages. By the same reasoning, it
California Civil Code section 1671 provides: "The parties to a contract may agree
therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of damage sustained
by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable or
extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." See generally, Sweet, Liquidated Damages
in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84 (1972); Comment, The Liquidated Damages Clause
in a California Contract for the Sale of Real Property, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 301 (1962).
It should be noted that the two principal cases discussed in these articles, Caplan v.
Schroeder, 56 Cal. 2d 515, 364 P.2d 321, 15 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1961) and Freedman v. The
Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951), were followed in Cook v. King Manor &
Convalescent Hosp., 41 Cal. App. 3d 782, 115 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1974).
174. 87 Cal. 443, 25 P. 749 (1891).
175. See J. HETLAND, SYLLABUS ON CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY SECURITY TRANS-
ACTIONS (1963). Section 3307 provides: "The detriment caused by the breach of an
agreement to purchase an estate in real property, is deemed to be the excess, if any, of
the amount which would have been due to the seller, under the contract, over the value
of the property to him."
176. See, e.g., Ricker v. Rombaugh, 120 Cal. App. 2d 912, 261 P.2d 328 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1953); Electrical Products Corp. v. Williams, 117 Cal. App. 2d 813, 256
P.2d 403 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1953).
177. 120 Cal. App. 2d 912, 261 P.2d 328 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1953).
178. Id. at 919, 261 P.2d at 331.
179. Note that Ricker was followed in Vincent v. Grayson, 30 Cal. App. 3d 899,
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would seem that a due-on-sale clause must be invalid if joined with
a prepayment provision.
Thus far, however, the California courts have consistently upheld
all types of prepayment penalties imposed by a lender upon accelera-
tion. It may be recalled that in Hellbaum v. Lytton Savings and Loan
Association,8 ° the court ruled that a lender's right to accelerate upon
transfer by the trustor-obligor, and his right to impose a fee for prepay-
ment, did not constitute an unlawful restraint on alienation. In the
case of Meyers v. Home Savings and Loan Association,'8 . the court
held that prepayment provisions are generally valid, as an alternative
method given to the debtor of paying his debt and do not constitute
liquidated damages."8 2
No due-on-sale clause was involved in Meyers. Nevertheless,
when Meyers is considered together with Hellbaum and a number of
other cases,' 8 1 there is reason to believe that a court would reach the
same result in a case involving a prepayment fee used in conjunction
with a due-on-sale clause. This result seems inherently unfair, particu-
larly when the disparity of bargaining power between the lender and
the trustor-obligor is considerable. 8 4  Under present case law, how-
ever, it is improbable that a court could be convinced to decide other-
wise.
The "Due-on" Clause as Adhesion Contract
A final argument often made is that the "due-on" clause should
be deemed unenforceable as an adhesion contract. 18 5 Unfortunately,
106 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1973).
180. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969). See text accompanying notes
19-20 supra.
181. 38 Cal. App. 3d 544, 113 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974).
182. Id. at 546, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60. The court distinguished its holding from
that in Garrett v. Coast & Southern Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d
1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973). In Garrett, plaintiffs were obligors under promissory
notes secured by deeds of trust in favor of defendant savings and loan association. Each
plaintiff was assessed a late charge owing to an alleged tardiness in the tendering of an
installment payment. Plaintiffs sought recovery of the sums assessed on the grounds that
they constituted unlawful liquidated damages under California Civil Code section 1670.
The supreme court held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action and reversed the
lower court's order of dismissal.
The court in Meyers stated that Garrett clearly involved the "breach of an
obligation" contemplated by section 1670, but that no such breach was involved in the
instant case.
183. French v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 16 Cal. 2d 26, 104 P.2d 655 (1940)
(upholding prepayment fees against charges of usury); Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San
Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971) (a
prepayment fee does not constitute an unlawful restraint on alienation).
184. See text accompanying notes 185-203 infra.
185. See, e.g., Valensi, The Due on Sale Clause-A Dissenting Opinion, 45 L.A.B.
BuIL. 121, 122 (1970); Comment, Applying the Brakes to Acceleration Clauses:
the status of the California law with respect to adhesion contracts is
in many respects unclear. Although the California legislature has re-
jected the unconscionability section of the Uniform Commercial
Code,"8 6 the state courts have long professed that they will not enforce
unconscionable agreements.1
87
The doctrine of unconscionability was employed by the early
American equity courts, especially to invalidate land contracts contain-
ing harsh forfeiture agreements or attempts to bar mortgage redemp-
tions.' 8 Although unconscionability has recently been the subject of
much discussion within the commercial setting, some scholars have ar-
gued that the doctrine is still best applied to real estate transactions. 89
After all, most people make very few purchases of real property during
their lifetimes, and they are likely to hold inferior bargaining positions
when dealing with more experienced sellers. 90 In addition, the pur-
chase price of a parcel of land is usually more economically significant
for both the buyer and the seller than the purchase price of a particular
piece of merchandise.' 91
The adhesion contract is a potential source of unconscionability.
It has been defined as a "standardized contract, which, imposed and
Controlling Their Misuse in Real Property Secured Transactions, 9 CAL. WEST. L. REv.
514, 525 (1973).
186. Hurd & Bush, Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for California
Consumers, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hurd & Bush]. Section
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code reads: "(1) If the court as a matter of law finds
the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result." The Uniform Commercial
Code applies only to transactions involving the sale of goods. Nevertheless, the reasoning
employed in the code has been extended by analogy to other types of transactions.
187. An unconscionable contract has been defined as one "such as no man in his
senses and not under a delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair
man would accept on the other." Swanson v. Hempstead, 64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 688, 149
P.2d 404, 407 (1944). One article, in criticizing this definition, states: "Little, if any, use
has ever been made of this rather untenable definition, however, and no later California
cases have used unconscionability as the sole basis for relief. Because the California
courts have not utilized the doctrine of unconscionability, they have been forced to seek
other grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation, lack of mutuality, and finding contract
clauses to be ambiguous in an attempt to reach the same result." Brittenham, Coombs,
Henderson, Mann & Reitner, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 890, 1000 (1969).
188. Harrington, Unconscionability under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 So.
TEx. L.J. 203 (1968). See generally Craig v. Hukill, 37 W. Va. 520, 16 S.E. 363 (1892);
3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 926-28 (5th ed. Symons 1941).
189. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 485, 535 (1967).
190. Id.
191. Id.
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drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the
subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or re-
ject it."'1 2 The weaker party, frequently in need of the goods or ser-
vices, is not in a position to shop around for better terms, either be-
cause the stronger party has a monopoly or because all competitors use
the same clause.'
9 3
The "due-on" clause seems to fit this description. It is a standard
form provision. Most, if not all lenders use it. Indeed, in Tucker,
the president and general manager of Lassen Savings and Loan testi-
fied that the due-on-sale clause was never deleted from any deed of
trust which their institution issued.'
Nevertheless, the California courts have narrowly defined the
types of adhesion contracts which they refuse to enforce. The Cali-
fornia adhesion contracts doctrine has thus far been limited in applica-
tion to form contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power;
the superior party is frequently some type of public service enter-
prise."" Moreover, the California courts have employed the doctrine
primarily when dealing with exculpatory provisions in insurance poli-
cies, and they have not often ventured into other areas.' 96  Neverthe-
less, since the elements of unconscionability found in insurance cases
may also be present in various other situations in which standard form
provisions are involved, there is no inherent reason why the courts can-
not extend their application of the adhesion doctrine.' 97
192. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,
784 (1961).
193. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. Rnv. 629, 632 (1943). Slawson writes that adhesion contracts gain no
legitimacy from the supposed consent of the adhering party, since manifestations which
are known to be the product of adhesion do not constitute true consent. As a result, the
legitimacy of adhesion contracts depends on their compliance with standards in the
public interest. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lavmak-
ing Power, 84 HArV. L. REv. 529, 566 (1971).
194. Brief for Respondents at 7, Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d
629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
195. Hurd & Bush, supra note 186, at 36. In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of
California, the court noted that in placing particular contracts within or without the
category of those affected with a public interest, the California courts have roughly
indicated the type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions will be held invalid:
(1) the transaction concerns a matter generally thought suitable for public regulation;
(2) the party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance
to the public; (3) the party holds himself out as being willing to perform the service for
any member of the public coming within certain established sthndards; and (4) the party
invoking exculpation has decisively superior strength. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of
California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-100, 383 P.2d 441, 444-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36-38 (1963).
See generally Comment, Contracts of Adhesion Under California Law, 1 U.S.F.L. REv.
306 (1963).
196. Hurd & Bush, supra note 186, at 35.
197. Id.
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The doctrine might well be extended to include a "due-on"
clause in a deed of trust issued by an institutional lender. The courts
have several times categorized banks and other lending institutions as
public service enterprises. 198  Furthermore, the lender who is bene-
fited by a "due-on" clause is often in a superior bargaining position,
especially when the trustor-obligor is a small developer or simply the
purchaser of a single family dwelling. Thus, it is not surprising that
in La Sala the court suggested that an adhesion situation might con-
ceivably arise in a case involving a due-on-sale clause. 199
A further limitation, however, has been placed on the California
doctrine of adhesion contracts. The state courts have thus far
limited their application of the doctrine to instances in which the adher-
ing party did not understand the term in question. For example, the
doctrine has been applied to cases in which a party signed a detailed
agreement in order to obtain particular goods or services, without truly
comprehending each of the provisions in the document. 00 The courts
have held that in such instances a clause must be "conspicuous, plain
and clear" in order to be enforceable."' California courts have not
yet extended the adhesion doctrine to the situation in which the adher-
ing party knows of an unfair term, but is precluded from bargaining
for its removal. °2  This hesitancy of the courts is unfortunate, since
a buyer may knowingly accept such a term because he needs what the
stronger party offers or can receive no better treatment anywhere
else.
203
198. See, e.g., Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sav. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293
(1919); Frankini v. Bank of America, 12 Cal. App. 2d 298, 55 P.2d 232 (1936). See
generally Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the
New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1276-77 (1967).
199. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 876-77, 489 P.2d 1113, 1120-21, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 856-57
(1971).
200. Hurd & Bush, supra note 186, at 32-33. See also Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 10
Cal. 3d 216, 514 P.2d 1219, 110 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1973); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
v. Jacober, 10 Cal. 3d 193, 514 P.2d 953, 110 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973); Thompson v.
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 904, 513 P.2d 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1973); Steven
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
201. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1962).
202. Various efforts have been made to categorize the forms of unconscionability.
Professor Leff distinguishes "substantive" from "procedural" unconscionability. He writes
"there are two separate social policies which are embodied in the equity unconscionabili-
ty doctrine. The first is that bargaining naughtiness, once it reaches a certain level, ought
to avail the practitioner naught. The second is directed not against bargaining conduct
(except insofar as certain results often are strong evidence of certain conduct otherwise
unproved) but against results and embodies the doctrine . . . that the infliction of
serious hardship demands special justification." Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-
The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 539 (1967).
203. Hurd & Bush, supra note 186, at 43. See generally Roos, Doctrine of Uncon-
scionability: Alive and Well in California, 9 CAl.. WEST L. REv. 100 (1972).
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In any event, the extent to which the doctrine of adhesion con-
tracts might apply to the "due-on" clause is unclear. The doctrine
should apply if the trustor-obligor is unaware of the clause and has no
reason to be aware of its existence. It might also apply if the trustor-
obligor is aware of the clause but does not comprehend the serious
ramifications of the lender's ability to accelerate at will. On the other
hand, the courts would probably not invoke the doctrine of adhesion
contracts to invalidate a "due-on" clause if the trustor-obligor is aware
of the existence of the clause and fully comprehends how it might be
used against him.
Finally, it should be observed that if the Tucker test is applied
as suggested earlier in this note,20 4 the adhesion contracts problem
would become moot. It would be difficult to argue that a "due-on"
clause which permits a lender to accelerate only when he can prove
severe damage to his security is an unconscionable provision. The sug-
gested extension of the Tucker test would thus serve to resolve trouble-
some problems of unconscionability.
Conclusion
Viewed in the most limited way, Tucker holds merely that a len-
der may not automatically enforce a due-on-sale clause in instances in
which the trustor-obligor has entered into an installment land contract
with a third party. Nonetheless, the case suggests potentially vast
ramifications. The rule announced in Tucker relative to the lender's
ability to exercise a "due-on" clause is a fair one, and it should be ex-
tended as indicated in this discussion.
Moreover, in a larger sense, Tucker must be considered an im-
portant victory against the overreaching which is sometimes practiced
by lending institutions. As the California Supreme Court becomes in-
creasingly sensitive to the position of borrowers, it will hopefully grant
them even greater protection.
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